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Circuit Courts with Plenary Jurisdiction and
Administrative Agencies with Exclusive
Jurisdiction: Can They Peacefully Coexist in
Missouri?
Paul M. Spinden*

I. INTRODUCTION
For Missouri courts, 2009 was the year of jurisdiction. The year began
with the Supreme Court of Missouri’s momentous pronouncement that the
state’s circuit courts have broad subject matter jurisdiction – jurisdiction that
is plenary in scope.1 Its breadth is so expansive that successful motions to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction seem to be a relic of the past.2
As momentous as that revelation was, another at the end of the year was even
more epochal: the circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is so broad that it
engulfs even matters that the General Assembly delegates to the exclusive
jurisdiction of administrative agencies, such as workers’ compensation.3
The reason for these revelations was a change to the Missouri Constitution – one that occurred more than three decades before. In 1976, Missourians amended their constitution to give circuit courts “original jurisdiction
over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.”4 The amendment took away
the General Assembly’s authority to put statutory restrictions on circuit
courts’ subject matter jurisdiction. As significant as the amendment was,
surprisingly there is little evidence that anyone took much notice of it before
* Spinden is associate professor at Liberty University School of Law where he
teaches administrative law, civil procedure, contracts, and criminal law. He served as
judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991-2008, and was a commissioner for the
Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, 1986-91, and administrative law judge
for the Missouri Department of Transportation, 1985-86. He acknowledges with
much gratitude the excellent assistance with this Article by his former law clerk, Ms.
Kimberly Boeding.
1. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253-54 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
2. Id. at 254 (“[So long as a] case is a civil case . . . the circuit court has subject
matter jurisdiction and, thus, has the authority to hear [the] dispute.”).
3. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
4. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14(a). Before the change, the provision granted circuit
courts “jurisdiction over all criminal cases not otherwise provided for by law,
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases not otherwise provided for, and concurrent and appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.” MO. CONST. art. V, § 14
(amended 1976).
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the Supreme Court of Missouri shined the spotlight on it in 2009 in J.C.W. ex
rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla.5 It seems odd that it took thirty-three years for Missouri courts to perceive the significance of the constitution’s grant of allencompassing power to trial courts. This begs two questions: what precipitated the change and what was the change all about?
When the Supreme Court finally took notice of the amendment in
J.C.W., the court asserted that the change solved the perplexities of subject
matter jurisdiction for Missouri judges.6 In fact, the court assured, the constitutional amendment simplified analysis of jurisdictional issues in Missouri by
allowing judges to determine their courts’ subject matter jurisdiction simply
by asking whether a lawsuit is a civil case or matter.7 If it is, judges can be
certain that their courts have subject matter jurisdiction, and that any issue
arising in a case speaking in jurisdictional terms – such as a statute requiring
posting of a bond to file a petition – is not jurisdictional.8
As simple as J.C.W.’s analysis seems to be, it apparently was rather unsettling for Missouri judges. It was a huge change in their analysis of jurisdictional issues, requiring them to jettison longstanding, entrenched concepts
and traditions – and traditions tend to be tenacious.9 Moreover, judges, like
most individuals, intrinsically distrust anything new.10 Thus Missouri judges
struggled to apply J.C.W.’s simple approach at the outset, most notably in
cases involving administrative agency jurisdiction. In a case questioning the
jurisdiction of the Missouri Division of Workers’ Compensation, an apparently exasperated appellate judge commented that, after J.C.W., “confusion . . .
seems to permeate any use of the word ‘jurisdiction.’”11
5. 275 S.W.3d 249.
6. The complexities of jurisdictional doctrine – easy to define but difficult to

apply – have long vexed judges. LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 41 (4th ed. 2009). J.C.W. estimated that Missouri judges should have
easier go of sorting out the doctrine than federal judges because, “[i]n contrast to the
federal system, the subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri’s courts is governed directly by the state's constitution.” 275 S.W.3d at 253.
7. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254.
8. Id.
9. Traditions’ tenacious hold and individuals’ resistance to change calls to mind
the celebrated poem by Robert Frost, “Mending Wall,” which depicts two farmers
who devotedly repair each spring a stone fence separating their farms. Neither farmer
needs a fence, but one farmer, smitten by tradition, endures the arduous task in unthinking deference to an adage his father taught him: good fences make good neighbors. The other farmer readily recognizes that the fence is not needed but faithfully
maintains it simply because he always has. ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in NORTH
OF BOSTON 11, 11-13 (1915).
10. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 27 (Peter Constantine, trans., Modern
Library 2008) (“Men intrinsically do not trust new things that they have not experienced themselves.”).
11. State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14,
44 n.12 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (Welsh, J., dissenting).
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Adding to judges’ confusion was the Supreme Court’s failure to lay
down clear rules in J.C.W. In explaining how judges should handle statutes
that make jurisdictional-sounding requirements, J.C.W. instructed only that
they should “read [them] as merely setting statutory limits on remedies or
elements of claims for relief that courts may grant.”12 In other words, judges
are to treat such restrictions as non-jurisdictional rules. But J.C.W. did not
say whether all statutory restrictions are non-jurisdictional – even those setting time deadlines or those giving an administrative agency exclusive jurisdiction over a particular subject matter. Judges trying to apply J.C.W. spent
much time debating these matters.13 As former United States Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart observed, “The art of being a judge, if there is such an
art, is in announcing clear rules . . . .”14
But the most notable consequence of J.C.W.’s simplified approach is its
effect on adjudication by Missouri administrative agencies. The General
Assembly granted these agencies exclusive jurisdiction in special areas, such
as on-the-job accidents, based on the perception that these subjects require
expertise and specialized knowledge.15 In McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores
East, L.P.,16 the court relied heavily on J.C.W. to conclude that a statute making workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for on-the-job accidents17
was merely a non-jurisdictional statutory restriction.18 McCracken over12. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 255.
13. Confirming Judge Welsh’s observation that, after J.C.W., Missouri’s judges

found themselves in a quandary concerning any use of the term “jurisdiction,” see
supra text accompanying note 11, the court in Evans v. Empire District Electric Co.
noted the appellate court’s struggle to determine whether failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional issue and the dispute between the Eastern and
Western districts concerning the matter. 346 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Mo. App. W.D.
2011). Moreover, the cases cited in Part III.E. infra chronicle the courts’ struggle to
analyze time deadlines, previously deemed jurisdictional issues, according to the
J.C.W. analytical paradigm.
14. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983). A couple of years before J.C.W., a law student commenting on a confusing line of Missouri cases used Justice Stewart’s observation to admonish the court of its need to articulate clear rules. Alison K. Spinden, Slurred
Speech and Double Vision: Missouri’s Supreme Court is Unsteady on DWI Standard,
72 MO. L. REV. 1411, 1411 (2007). The Supreme Court of Missouri acknowledged
the need to resolve the confusion in White v. Director of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298,
307 n.8 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
15. See generally Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo.
1991) (en banc) (“[C]ourts will not decide a controversy involving a question within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal until after that tribunal has rendered its
decision: (1) where administrative knowledge and expertise are demanded . . . .”).
16. 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
17. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (Supp. 2012).
18. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 475.
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turned a long line of cases holding that the Division of Workers’ Compensation has jurisdiction exclusive of the circuit courts to determine workers’
compensation cases.19 The court said those cases “confused the concept of a
circuit court’s jurisdiction . . . with the separate issue of the circuit court’s
statutory or common law authority to grant relief in a particular case.”20 It
decided that the division’s exclusive jurisdiction over workplace accidents
was not jurisdictional at all, but was merely a waivable affirmative defense.21
McCracken portends significant modifications to how the state courts
perceive the interrelation between Missouri administrative agency adjudications and circuit courts’ jurisdictional power. The courts’ treatment of exclusive administrative remedies as non-jurisdictional issues has the potential to
undermine administrative agencies’ effectiveness in addressing society’s
manifold problems.22 McCracken compels trial judges to proceed with adjudicating workers’ compensation cases masquerading as tort actions – even
when the facts clearly demonstrate that the claims arose out of an on-the-job
accident – unless the parties assert workers’ compensation as an affirmative
defense, and only then if they properly assert it.23 One of the key consequences of McCracken is that the judiciary’s enforcement of an exclusive
administrative remedy depends entirely on the parties’ requesting it.24
Moreover, the decision’s analysis raises the highly undesirable prospect
of unwieldy dual lines of cases: one adjudicated by administrative agencies,
and another potentially conflicting line adjudicated in the circuit courts. Not
only does the likelihood of unacceptable forum shopping emerge, but the
court’s decision also threatens to undercut administrative agencies’ policies
and ability to deal with the problems that motivated the General Assembly to
establish them in the first place.25
McCracken’s conclusions seem to rest on a faulty and weak foundation.
In deducing that workers’ compensation exclusivity is a non-jurisdictional
affirmative defense,26 the court misperceived workers’ compensation precedent. The primary reason for rethinking McCracken’s analysis is that the
Id. at 474.
Id. at 477.
Id.
As the Supreme Court of Missouri has recognized, applying expertise in
finding solutions to society’s problems is the raison d’être for the state’s administrative agencies. Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 1991) (en
banc). Robert Glicksman and Richard Levy have observed that “administrative agencies have proliferated because they are an efficient and effective means of implementing important public policies.”
ROBERT GLICKSMAN & RICHARD LEVY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 21 (2010).
23. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 477.
24. See id.
25. State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14,
51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (Smart, J., dissenting).
26. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 477.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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court apparently failed to appreciate that the circuit courts’ jurisdiction is not
an all-or-nothing matter. Recognition of workers’ compensation as an exclusive remedy is not mutually exclusive to the circuit courts’ plenary subject
matter jurisdiction. Sound analysis was available to the McCracken court that
would have permitted exclusive agency remedies and plenary circuit court
jurisdiction to peacefully coexist.27
Because the centerpiece of both J.C.W.’s and McCracken’s analyses was
the wording of Missouri’s constitutional provision granting jurisdiction to the
circuit courts, Part II examines this provision, including its impetus. Part III
considers J.C.W.’s exposition of jurisdiction and focuses on its contention
that the Missouri Constitution necessarily excludes statutory restrictions on
the judiciary’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. Part IV closely examines McCracken’s application of J.C.W.’s analysis to the issue of exclusive
administrative remedies and agency jurisdiction. Finally, Part V suggests
alternative analyses that maintain exclusive remedies for workers’ compensation and other administrative agencies while preserving the circuit courts’
plenary subject matter jurisdiction.

II. THE CONSTITUTION’S BROAD GRANT OF
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A. Significance of the Scope of the Circuit Courts’
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In J.C.W., the Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting a circuit
court from considering a child custody dispute because one of the parties had
not posted a bond was not jurisdictional.28 The court held that the Missouri
Constitution forbids the statute from affecting the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.29 Instead, the statutory restriction must be treated as
a non-jurisdictional issue. If an issue does not involve jurisdiction, it necessarily must be a non-jurisdictional matter – either a matter of procedure, or of
the substantive merits on which a lawsuit will be determined.30

27. Four alternatives to the McCracken court’s analysis – each of which would
permit exclusive agency remedies and plenary circuit court jurisdiction to coexist –
are set out in Part V infra. These alternatives include (1) properly distinguishing
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facts; (2) interpreting the Missouri Constitution’s grant of plenary jurisdiction to circuit courts to not include administrative
adjudications; (3) deeming exclusive administrative remedies that masquerade as tort
actions to be non-justiciable; and (4) reinstating the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
Missouri’s jurisprudence.
28. 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
29. Id. at 255.
30. Id. at 254. The court read the requisite bond to put a limit “on remedies or
elements of claims for relief that courts may grant.” Id. at 255.
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The court’s analysis rested almost entirely on its interpretation of Article
V, section 14(a) of the Missouri Constitution, which states, “The circuit
courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and
criminal.”31 The J.C.W. Court emphasized the provision’s “plenary terms”32
and apparently interpreted its reference to “all cases and matters” as encompassing the universe of civil and criminal cases.33 By giving the circuit court
authority to hear any civil or criminal case, the J.C.W. court reasoned, the
constitution necessarily prohibits any restriction that would decrease the circuit court’s jurisdictional power and render it less than all-encompassing.34
The statutory restriction at issue in J.C.W. prohibited the circuit court
from considering a petition for modification of a child custody decree under
certain conditions, including a petitioner’s failure to post of a bond.35 On the
grounds that the Missouri Constitution forbade treating the statute as jurisdictional, the J.C.W. court concluded that the circuit court could heed the statute
only by deeming it non-jurisdictional.36 “When a statute speaks in jurisdictional terms or can be read in such terms,” the court instructed, “it is proper to
read it as merely setting statutory limits on remedies or elements of claims for
relief that courts may grant.”37 In other words, the court’s position is that,
because the circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is plenary, the only impediments that the General Assembly can impose on the circuit courts’ exercise of subject matter jurisdiction are non-jurisdictional rules concerning procedure and substantive merits of a cause of action.
The issue is quite crucial in its effect on the adjudicative process. If a
rule is jurisdictional, the circuit court is duty-bound to enforce it, even if it
must do so sua sponte,38 but if a rule is non-jurisdictional, the circuit court
cannot enforce it unless a party requests enforcement of the rule and does so
in a proper manner.39 This renders the non-jurisdictional rule merely a matter
31. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14(a) (1945, as amended 1976).
32. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 253.
33. The court never says that it believes section 14(a)’s reference to “all cases

and matters” is all-encompassing, but see infra Part III.C for discussion of why this
inference seems to be valid.
34. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 253-54.
35. The statute said:
When a person filing a petition for modification of a child custody decree
owes past due child support to a custodial parent in an amount in excess of ten
thousand dollars, such person shall post a bond in the amount of past due child
support owed as ascertained by the division of child support enforcement or
reasonable legal fees of the custodial parent, whichever is greater, before the
filing of the petition.

MO. REV. STAT. § 452.455.4 (2000), repealed by H.B. 481, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009).
36. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 255.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 254.
39. See id. at 257-58.
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of the parties’ trial strategy. Moreover, as J.C.W. emphasized, courts tend to
enforce jurisdictional rules much more strictly and zealously than they do
non-jurisdictional procedural rules.40 Judges tend to heed jurisdictional rules
“rigidly, literally, and mercilessly,”41 partly because they understand that
acting without jurisdiction can render their judgments a nullity. Mistaken
application of a non-jurisdictional rule will, at worst, constitute reversible
error, and the mistake will typically go unaddressed unless a party preserves
the error for appeal by raising it at the proper time. Furthermore, unlike jurisdictional rules, non-jurisdictional issues rarely constitute a basis for a collateral attack of the court’s judgment.
The court in McCracken read J.C.W.’s point concerning statutory restrictions as applying to statutes that mandate exclusive administrative remedies, such as workers’ compensation.42 This understanding of J.C.W. has
significant ramifications for the operation of administrative agencies in Missouri. These agencies derive virtually all of their authority from statutes;
therefore, treating statutes that delegate jurisdiction to administrative agencies
as mere non-jurisdictional rules can substantially thwart the General Assembly’s ability to establish agencies with exclusive, unshared authority. Thus,
because J.C.W.’s analysis hinged entirely on its interpretation of Article V,
section 14(a), tracing that provision’s history is beneficial for a complete
understanding of the interrelation between circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction and administrative agencies’ exclusive jurisdiction.

B. Reason for the Constitution’s Broad Grant of
Jurisdictional Power to the Circuit Courts
The present wording of Article V, section 14(a) emerged in 1976 after
much of Missouri’s bureaucracy had functioned for decades.43 Before then,
section 14 expressly provided authority for the legislature to establish administrative agencies and to grant those agencies exclusive jurisdiction. The
former section 14 declared that the state circuit courts had original jurisdiction “over all criminal cases not otherwise provided for by law, exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil cases not otherwise provided for, and concurrent and appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.”44 Section 14 thus made
40. Id. at 251 (“[Jurisdiction] has magic because it can make judgments disappear, as in: ‘The judgment is a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction.’”).
41. Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1, 5 (1994).
42. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
43. Workers’ compensation, for example, began functioning in 1927, and the
Public Service Commission came into existence in 1913. Bethel v. Sunlight Janitor
Serv., 551 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); About the PSC, MO. PUB. SERV.
COMM’N., http://psc.mo.gov/General/About_The_PSC (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
44. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14 (amended in 1976) (emphasis added).
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the circuit courts’ original jurisdiction subject to other provisions of law, including the General Assembly’s statutes.
The impetus for amending section 14 was the reorganization of the
state’s multi-tiered system of trial courts. Before the reorganization, the trial
courts consisted of a confusing array of independent courts, some of which
were unique to a particular location.45 Circuit courts operated alongside separate probate and magistrate courts and an odd mixture of courts with unique,
independent jurisdictions, typically established by statute, in locales such as
St. Louis and Hannibal.46 Each acted independently of, and at times in conflict with, each other.47
Appearing on the August 1976 primary election ballot,48 Missouri voters
narrowly approved49 a twenty-six page proposal that completely overhauled
the court system. It merged all but the municipal courts into a single, unitary
circuit court system.50 This reorganization required repeal of statutes setting
the previous courts’ jurisdictions, but drafters of the reform measures feared
that they would not be able to find all of the statutes needing to be repealed.51
The drafters’ apprehension caused them to propose deleting section 14’s ref-

45. Carter Stith, Amendment No. 6 Would Abolish Complex Court System in St.
Louis, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPTACH, July 19, 1976, at 3B.
46. Id. An example of one of the courts with unique jurisdiction was the Court
of Criminal Corrections in St. Louis. Id. This court was established in 1866 “for
reasons no one seems to recall, but possibly to give city politicians an extra wedge of
patronage to spread; or possibly to remove minor criminal matters from the hands of
justices of the peace.” Id.
47. See id.
48. Officials put the measure on the primary election ballot in August rather than
on the general election ballot in November to ward off an initiative petition calling for
a different set of reform measures being circulated by a citizens’ group. Ted Gest,
Judicial Amendment Is Compromise, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 20, 1976, at 3B.
The group’s aim was to get their countermeasures on the November general election
ballot. Id. Gov. Christopher Bond preempted their effort by putting the General
Assembly’s proposal, backed by the Supreme Court and the Missouri Bar leadership,
on the August primary election ballot. Id.
49. Only 51.6 percent of the slightly more than one million votes cast favored
reform. Primary Election Returns: Vote on Proposed Constitutional Amendments
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 at Special Election Tuesday, August 3, 1976, in 1977-1978
OFFICIAL MANUAL OF STATE OF MISSOURI 1255, 1257 (Kenneth M. Johnson, ed.
1979). The vote count was 518,521 in favor and 485,536 opposed. Id.
50. Richard J. Hardy & Joseph J. Carrier, Missouri Courts, Judges, and Juries, in
MISSOURI GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 173, 174-75 (Richard J. Hardy et al. eds.,
Univ. of Missouri Press rev. & enlarged ed. 1995); see also Charles B. Blackmar,
Missouri’s Nonpartisan Court Plan from 1942 to 2005, 72 MO. L. REV. 199, 207-08
(2007).
51. Interview with Alex Bartlett, Attorney (January 20, 2012) [hereinafter Bartlett Interview]. The Missouri Bar retained Bartlett, a Jefferson City attorney, to aid
with the Missouri Bar’s push for court reform. Id.
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erence to other provisions of law, with the effect of granting the reorganized
circuit courts plenary jurisdiction.52
The drafters did not propose the deletion because they perceived a need
for plenary jurisdiction or other change in policy; it was strictly a matter of
pragmatics.53 They proposed the deletion only out of concern for protecting
the reform effort, which was not without its opponents,54 from an attack
against the newly-formed courts’ jurisdiction.55 Drafters feared that a successful attack on the courts’ jurisdiction could arise from some obscure statute originally attached to one of the previously independent courts that had
not been repealed.56
To reformers, the deletion seemed the simplest, most straightforward solution.57 Having been rebuffed for more than a decade by the General Assembly, reformers feared losing the opportunity presented by the legislature’s
sudden change of heart, which came under the threat of reformers taking the
matter directly to voters.58 A constitutional grant of plenary power would
overcome any forgotten statute that might be dragged from the recesses of the
statute books.59
A key point in section 14(a)’s history is that the drafters did not intend
for the judiciary’s broadened jurisdiction to affect or alter operation of
the Division of Workers’ Compensation or any other state administrative
agency.60 Indeed, as the drafters strategized and deliberated, they never gave
any thought to administrative agencies or their jurisdiction.61 Unanticipated
consequences are a hazard of any reform effort,62 certainly when the reformation is of the magnitude of Missouri’s court reorganization. Nonetheless,
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Although opposition to the reform was low key and not organized, a few

opponents, including a citizens group that had pushed for more extensive reform
measures, spoke out against the proposal. Gest, supra note 48. What criticism that
was voiced tended to be overshadowed by one of six other proposed constitutional
amendments appearing on the ballot, a proposal to modify the strict ban of Missouri’s
constitution on state assistance to church-related schools. Dana L. Spitzer, Nonpublic
School Aid A Hot Issue for August, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 20, 1976, at 1B.
55. Bartlett Interview, supra note 51.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The General Assembly had begrudgingly relented to repeated calls for
reorganizing Missouri’s confusing court system only when the Missouri Bar and an
independent citizens group initiated separate petition drives that would have bypassed
the legislature by taking the issue directly to voters. Judicial Reform Vote is Tuesday,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 1976, at 2J.
59. Bartlett Interview, supra note 51.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Machiavelli, supra note 10, at 27 (“Nothing is harder to do, more dubious to
succeed at, or more dangerous to manage than . . . introducing a new order.”).
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the court reorganization and the amendment of section 14 undoubtedly had a
negative effect on administrative agencies’ jurisdictional authority as perceived by the Supreme Court of Missouri in McCracken.

C. Initial Perceptions of the Amendment’s Effect on
Administrative Agencies’ Jurisdictional Authority
After the amendment of section 14 became effective on September 2,
1976,63 administrative agencies continued to function as they always had, and
the courts continued to enforce exclusive administrative remedies as a matter
of jurisdiction.64 Not until 1991, in Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,
did Missouri’s appellate courts consider a contention that the amendment of
section 14 affected an administrative agency’s exclusive authority to adjudicate subject matter assigned to it by the General Assembly.65 One of the
questions in Goodrum was whether the amended section 14 granted circuit
courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Division of Workers’ Compensation.66
The plaintiffs asserted that, because the circuit courts could hear all civil cases and matters, claimants had a choice of filing their action with the division
or in the civil courts.67
The plaintiffs in Goodrum were the parents of a man who died from ingesting a substance – apparently a narcotic – given to him by his work foreman during work hours.68 The parents sought to avoid a workers’ compensation remedy in favor of pursuing a tort remedy against the decedent’s employer.69 They sued their son’s former employer and foreman for negligence
63. 1975-76 MO. LAWS 819-34.
64. See, e.g., State ex rel. MW Builders, Inc. v. Midkiff, 222 S.W.3d 267, 268

(Mo. 2007) (en banc); State ex rel. Tri-Cnty. Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Dial, 192 S.W.3d
708, 712 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d
6, 7 (Mo. 1992); Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Mo. 1991) (en
banc); State ex rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Ryan, 745 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo.
1988) (en banc), overruled by McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d
473 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); Jones v. Jay Truck Driver Training Ctr., Inc., 709 S.W.2d
114, 115 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), overruled by McCracken, 298 S.W.3d 473; State ex
rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Luten, 679 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
65. Goodrum, 824 S.W.2d at 12. Because the court handed down its decision on
January 28, 1992, an assumption that the appellate courts began considering it during
1991 seems fairly safe.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 11-12. The plaintiffs asserted several other constitutional attacks before arguing that section 14 granted the circuit court concurrent jurisdiction over the
lawsuit. Id. at 7. That the plaintiffs did not put a lot of stock in this argument seems
to be a safe assumption.
68. Id. The court described the substance as “white cross” and reported that it
apparently caused the decedent to suffer sun-stroke, cardio-respiratory arrest, and
acute renal failure. Id. He died twenty days after reacting to the substance. Id.
69. See id.
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and intentional tort.70 The circuit court sustained the employer’s motion to
dismiss on grounds that, because the matter implicated workers’ compensation statutes, the division had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter,
including the power to determine whether the decedent’s injuries resulted
from an accident or intentional conduct.71 The Goodrum court agreed that
the division had “exclusive jurisdiction” to determine the issue and the circuit
court properly dismissed the case.72 In rejecting the contention that the circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction, the court explained that “Article V, the
Judicial Article, is devoted to governing the courts and judges, and we do not
read the [1976] amendment [to section 14] as a constraint upon the previously
established power of the administrative agencies.”73 Thus, the court properly
understood the amendment. It did not affect the division’s exclusive jurisdiction over workers’ compensation cases, and it did not extend the circuit
courts’ jurisdiction beyond traditional civil actions to include administrative
adjudicative cases.74 The amendment simply did not accord circuit courts
concurrent jurisdiction with administrative agencies.75
Missouri appellate courts did not again consider a challenge to the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy until McCracken.76 For seventeen years, Missouri courts persisted in treating exclusive administrative
remedies as jurisdictional rules.77 After the 1976 constitutional amendment
and Goodrum, little changed in the way Missouri courts analyzed workers’
compensation statutes or any other statutes according an exclusive administrative remedy.78 Until 2009, when the J.C.W. court imparted its lesson on
jurisdiction, Missouri’s courts continued to assume that the Division of

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 12.
See id.
See id.
McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc) (finding only pre-1992 cases considering jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation defense).
77. As late as 2009, Missouri’s appellate courts still deemed a circuit court to
lack subject matter jurisdiction if a petitioner’s claim fell within the provisions of
workers’ compensation statutes. See, e.g., Olendorff v. St. Luke’s EpiscopalPresbyterian Hosps., 293 S.W.3d 47, 49 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (“A motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a proper means of raising the workers’ compensation law as a defense to a common law tort action.”); Battles v. United Fire
& Cas. Co., 295 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (mem.) (affirmed
circuit court’s dismissal of lawsuit “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for her alleged injuries falls under the workers’
compensation law”).
78. See Joseph H. Guffey & Nathan D. Sturycz, Asserting the Workers’ Compensation Exclusive Remedy Bar After McCracken, 66 J. MO. BAR 206, 206 (2010).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate any workers’
compensation claim to the exclusion of the circuit courts.79

III. J.C.W.’S FUNDAMENTAL LESSON IN JURISDICTION
J.C.W. was a domestic relations case involving issues of child custody
and child support.80 At the center of the controversy was a statute81 imposing
conditions on the circuit court’s authority to consider the petitioner’s claim.82
The appellate courts considering the statute deemed it to be a jurisdictional
bar to the circuit court adjudicating the matter; however, they could not agree
on how to characterize the jurisdictional issue.83 The appellate judges characterized the issue variously as a matter of personal jurisdiction,84 subject
matter jurisdiction, and jurisdictional competency.85 In J.C.W., the Supreme
Court of Missouri declared that all three characterizations were wrong;
the statute did not raise a jurisdictional issue at all.86 The court explained that
the statute was a non-jurisdictional rule that pertained to matters of procedure.87 In light of the appellate courts’ mischaracterization of the statute,
the Supreme Court perceived a need in J.C.W. to give a fundamental lesson
in jurisdiction.
Subpart A recounts the issues in dispute in J.C.W. that motivated the
court’s lesson in jurisdiction. Subpart B focuses on the first point of the
court’s lesson: rejection of the concept of jurisdictional competence and
recognition of only two forms of jurisdiction – personal and subject matter.
In tracing the history of Missouri courts’ recognition of jurisdictional competency prior to J.C.W., subpart B confirms the court’s conclusion that jurisdictional competency was merely a form of subject matter jurisdiction. Subpart
C considers the second and cornerstone point of the court’s lesson: that the
subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri’s circuit courts is plenary in scope.
This point opened the door to the McCracken court’s conclusion that the circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction in all cases, even those in which
79. See id. at 206-07.
80. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Mo. 2009)

(en banc).
th
81. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.455.4 (2000), repealed by H.B. 481, 95 Gen.
st
Assemb., 1 Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009). This statute is set out in full supra note 35.
82. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252.
83. See id.
84. See Miller v. Miller, 210 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007), abrogated
by J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d 249.
85. In considering J.C.W. before its transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri,
the Eastern District Court of Appeals deemed the statute to raise either an issue of
subject matter jurisdiction or “jurisdictional competence.” J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d
at 252.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 255.
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the General Assembly has granted exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative
agency. Subpart D addresses the court’s failure in J.C.W. to make an allimportant distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional factfinding, and subpart E shows how this failure has caused confusion among
judges trying to apply J.C.W.’s lesson.

A. The Dispute in J.C.W.
In J.C.W., Kelly Webb petitioned the circuit court for approval to move
with her two children from Missouri to California.88 She summoned the children’s father, Jason Wyciskalla, who responded by filing a motion asking the
circuit court, inter alia, to alter the child custody arrangement and his child
support obligations.89 After a hearing, the circuit court denied Webb’s request to relocate, granted Wyciskalla’s motion for modification of the custody arrangement, and declared that Wyciskalla had no child support obligations.90 On appeal, a central issue was whether the circuit court could enter
its order in light of Missouri Revised Statutes section 452.455.4.91 This statute requires parties seeking a change in child custody to post a bond if they
are more than $10,000 in arrears in their child payments.92 The J.C.W. court
acknowledged that the statute’s “plain language” prohibited Wyciskalla from
filing his motion to alter child custody.93
Before resolving the issue of the General Assembly’s power to prohibit
the filing of a petition, the court seized upon the opportunity to lay down a
six-paragraph, three-point lesson on the basics of jurisdiction.94 First, it declared that Missouri courts recognize only two kinds of jurisdiction – not
three, as the J.C.W. court believed its intermediate appellate judges to be suggesting.95 According to the court, the only types of jurisdiction cognizable by
Missouri courts are personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.96
J.C.W. thus sounded the death knell for the concept of jurisdictional competency, long understood by Missouri courts as an essential element of jurisdiction.97 Second, J.C.W. interpreted the Missouri Constitution as granting plenary subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit courts and declared that such
jurisdiction includes not only the circuit courts’ authority to adjudicate a category of cases (civil cases and matters and criminal cases and matters) but

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 252. Section 452.455.4 is set out supra note 35.
§ 452.455.4; see also J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252.
J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 256.
Id. at 252-54.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 254.
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also any issue affecting adjudication of a particular case.98 Third, it concluded that, in light of the circuit courts’ plenary jurisdiction, any statute imposing
conditions on a circuit court’s authority to adjudicate a case must be treated
as a waivable, non-jurisdictional rule.99

B. Missouri Courts Recognize Only Two Kinds of Jurisdiction
Concerning the first point of J.C.W.’s jurisdiction lesson was that
“Missouri courts recognize only two kinds of jurisdiction: subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction,”100 it is debatable whether Missouri
courts ever recognized more than two kinds of jurisdiction. For more than
a century before J.C.W.,101 Missouri was among a number of states that divided jurisdiction into three elements – or “essentials.”102 Missouri courts
did not begin dubbing the third essential as “jurisdictional competency” –
a term apparently unique to Missouri in this use – until around 1941,103 but
Missouri courts did not view the concept as a separate category of jurisdiction. Rather, they deemed it to be an element of a court’s overall jurisdictional authority along with jurisdiction’s other two elements: the subject of the
lawsuit (subject matter jurisdiction) and the court’s authority over the parties
(personal jurisdiction).104

Id. at 253-54.
See id. at 254-55.
Id. at 252.
See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
Although labeled various ways – in many cases only as “the third element of
jurisdiction” – a concept identical to Missouri’s jurisdictional competency has been
recognized in sixteen other states. Lewis v. Palmer, 67 Ariz. 189, 195, 193 P.2d 456,
459-460 (1948); Morgan v. Hartford Hosp., 301 Conn. 388, 401, 21 A.3d 451, 459
(2011); Arcadia Citrus Growers Ass’n. v. Hollingsworth, 135 Fla. 322, 326, 185 So.
431, 433 (1938); People v. Moran, 977 N.E.2d 801, 806 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012); City of
Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. 2005); Moeller v. Moeller, 175 Kan. 848,
858, 267 P.2d 536, 543 (1954); Newell Enters., Inc. v. Bowling, 158 S.W.3d 750, 757
(Ky. 2005); Fries v. Carpenter, 567 A.2d 437, 439 (Me. 1989); People v. Redman,
250 Mich. 334, 340, 230 N.W. 196, 198 (1930) (Potter, J. dissenting); Peisker v.
Chavez, 46 N.M. 159, 123 P.2d 726,728-729 (1942); Ashikian v. Okla. ex rel. Okla.
Horse Racing Comm’n,, 2008 OK 64, 188 P.3d 148, 154 (2008); Payne v. Com. Dept.
of Corr., 813 A.2d 918, 935 (Pa. 2002); Isham v. Sienknecht, 59 S.W. 779, 784
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1900); Alvarado v. Okla. Sur. Co., 281 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App.
2005); Drewry v. Doyle, 179 Va. 715, 720, 20 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1942); State v.
Barnes, 146 Wn. 2d 74, 85, 43 P.3d 490, 496 (2002) (en banc).
103. The first case found to attach the “competency” label to the concept was
State ex rel. Lambert v. Flynn, 154 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1941) (en banc).
104. See generally Scott Stephens, Florida’s Third Species of Jurisdiction, 82
FLA. B. J. 11 (2008) (proposing that jurisdiction is a “legal conclusion” that is dependent on the presence of three elements). As described in this Article, Florida courts
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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J.C.W. was correct, however, that what Missouri courts called jurisdictional competency actually was what most courts consider to be a component
of subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, a hornbook definition of subject matter
jurisdiction is that it is “the competency of a court to hear and decide particular categories of cases.”105 J.C.W. decided that continued recognition of
jurisdictional competency had sufficient “potential ill effects”106 that,
henceforth, Missouri judges must “confine their discussions of circuit
court jurisdiction to constitutionally recognized doctrines of personal
and subject matter jurisdiction . . . .”107 With that, jurisdictional competency
died unceremoniously.

1. History of the Concept of Jurisdictional Competency
The history of jurisdictional competency in Missouri makes clear that
Missouri courts had not treated the concept as a separate category of jurisdiction, as the J.C.W. court suggested. Instead, courts perceived the concept to
be a matter of proper pleading – that a court did not have jurisdiction unless a
party had pleaded a cause of action for which the court could grant relief.
The concept of jurisdictional competency originated in Missouri in 1891
with Hope v. Blair.108 In that case, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on a
New Jersey Supreme Court decision109 in concluding that jurisdiction has
“three essentials”: “First, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases
to which the one adjudged belongs; second, the proper parties must be present; and, third, the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the
issue.”110 The point of the third element, as explained by the Hope court, was
that a court did not have jurisdiction to consider a claim that was not included
in the pleadings:
A court may be said to have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a suit
when it has the right to proceed to determine the controversy or question in issue between the parties, or grant the relief prayed. What the
controversy or issue, in any case is, can only be determined from the
111
pleadings.

label the concept as “procedural jurisdiction.” Id. at 11. It is virtually identical to
Missouri’s jurisdictional competency. See Flynn, 154 S.W.2d at 57.
105. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 41 (emphasis of “competency” added).
106. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
107. Id.
108. 16 S.W. 595 (Mo. 1891).
109. Munday v. Vail, 34 N.J.L. 418 (N.J. 1871).
110. Hope, 16 S.W. at 597 (quoting Munday, 34 N.J.L. at 422) (internal quotations marks omitted).
111. Id.
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When the Supreme Court revisited the issue of jurisdictional competency
three years later in Charles v. White, it noted that the concept had gained wide
acceptance.112 The court, however, made a confusing observation: “[W]e
think that the trend of the courts of this country is to enlarge the definition of
jurisdiction with the statement that it should, properly defined, include not
only the power to hear and determine, but power to render the particular
judgment in the particular case.”113 As a close study of Hope and White reveals, jurisdictional competence did not broaden jurisdiction’s definition.
Instead, it referred only to circumstances in which “the court proceeds beyond
the allegations of the pleadings and the prayer for relief and decrees a matter
between parties defendant . . . .”114
When the Supreme Court of Missouri took up the matter of jurisdictional competency again three decades later in State ex rel. Lambert v. Flynn, the
court still deemed the concept to refer to a jurisdictional requirement that a
petitioner’s pleading state a cause of action.115 The facts in Flynn were similar to those in J.C.W. A former police officer seeking disability retirement
benefits sued the St. Louis Board of Trustees of the Police Retirement Pension System.116 The board contested the circuit court’s jurisdiction on the
ground that the petition did not plead that petitioner complied with statutory
requirements that he submit his claim to the board before filing his civil action.117 The Supreme Court previously held that the statutory requirements
were jurisdictional.118 The Flynn court concluded that the petition “did not
state a cause of action over which respondent could exercise jurisdiction.”119
In response to the argument that the board waived jurisdiction by appearing in
court and filing an answer, the Flynn court said:
[The argument assumes] that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter, and that the question was as to jurisdiction over the
person. Such is not the fact. It is said that the jurisdiction of a court to
adjudicate a controversy rests on three essentials: (1) jurisdiction of
subject matter; (2) jurisdiction of the res or the parties; (3) and jurisdiction to render the particular judgment in the particular case. The
first two are the grand subdivisions of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the
subject matter is derived from the law and cannot be conferred by con112. Charles v. White, 112 S.W. 545, 549 (Mo. 1908) (citing court decisions in
Indiana, Colorado, Minnesota, and West Virginia as accepting the view).
113. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
114. Id.
115. 154 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Mo. 1941).
116. Id. at 54.
117. Id. at 55.
118. See State ex rel. Lambert v. Padberg, 145 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Mo. 1940) (en
banc) (holding that whether a circuit court obtains jurisdiction is dependent on the law
at the time the action was filed).
119. Flynn, 154 S.W.2d at 56.
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sent. Jurisdiction over the person may be waived because it is a personal privilege.
But the third essential, jurisdiction to render the particular judgment in
the particular case, (sometimes called ‘competency’), partakes of the
character of one or the other of the first two. Where the lacking element of jurisdiction goes to the personal privilege of the litigant, it
may be waived. It is said in 21 C.J.S. [sec. 84]: “If the court cannot
try the question except under particular conditions or when approached in a particular way, the law withholds jurisdiction unless
such conditions exist or unless the court is approached in the manner
provided, and consent will not avail to change the provision of the law
in this regard.” In the instant case [the circuit] court had no power to
try the case until statutory conditions had been complied with and administrative remedies had been exhausted, and also unless these facts
were shown by the petition upon which respondent’s jurisdiction was
invoked. It partook of jurisdiction of the subject matter and could not
120
be waived by mere appearance of the [board].

The Flynn court, thus, did not view jurisdictional competency as a third category of jurisdiction, but as an “essential” to the exercise of jurisdiction.121
Like Hope and Charles, Flynn tied jurisdictional competency to the plaintiff’s
or petitioner’s filing a cause of action for which relief could be granted.122
Because the petitioner in Flynn failed to state a proper cause of action, Missouri’s supreme court concluded that the circuit court did not have competency to exercise its power over the lawsuit.123
As J.C.W. noted, Flynn did not question the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction;124 rather, Flynn readily acknowledged that the circuit court
had general authority to adjudicate the subject matter.125 Flynn’s holding was
that the petitioner’s failure to plead a cause of action for which relief could be
granted rendered the circuit court incompetent to exercise its jurisdictional
authority.126 Rather than resulting from confusion concerning jurisdiction, as
J.C.W. surmised,127 the Flynn court’s analysis hinged on a statutory requisite,

Id. at 57 (first citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Id.
See id.
Id.
J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 2009) (en
banc) (“[T]hese cases do not question the court’s subject matter or personal jurisdiction and really go to the court’s authority to render a particular judgment in a particular case.” (citations omitted)).
125. See Flynn, 154 S.W.2d at 57.
126. Id.
127. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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which at the time did not conflict with Missouri’s constitution.128 It merely
expressed a concept now embodied in Missouri’s law of civil procedure: failure to state a cause of action is jurisdictional because the petition does not
assert a case or matter, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction.129
As Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 55.27(f) provides, failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted is not among the defenses that can be
waived;130 obviously, this is because it is jurisdictional.
In light of this Article’s focus on the application of J.C.W.’s analysis to
administrative agencies, an interesting aside is the Supreme Court of Missouri’s reading of Flynn just three years before J.C.W. in In re Marriage of
Hendrix.131 In that case, the court approved Flynn’s conclusion that jurisdictional competence properly applied in the “narrow circumstance[]” of a party’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.132
Notwithstanding previous courts’ use of jurisdictional competency to refer to a requirement that a petitioner plead a cause of action, the J.C.W. court
decided that the time for rejecting the concept had come.133 Misperceiving
the doctrine as a third category of jurisdiction, the court concluded that the
concept was inconsistent with Article V, section 14(a) of the Missouri Constitution.134 “Because the authority of a court to render judgment in a particular
case is, in actuality, the definition of subject matter jurisdiction,” the court
reasoned, “there is no constitutional basis for this third jurisdictional concept
for statutes that would bar litigants from relief.”135 In addition, J.C.W. decided the doctrine’s demise was necessary for pragmatic reasons. The court
feared that continued recognition would erode the circuit courts’ subject mat128. At the time of the Flynn decision in 1941, the Missouri Constitution granted
the circuit courts “exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases not otherwise provided for . . . .” MO. CONST. art. V, § 14 (amended 1976) (emphasis added).
129. See State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Dolan, 256 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Mo. 2008)
(en banc) (“[T]he failure to state a cause of action is a jurisdictional defect because
there is no subject matter on which the court can take jurisdiction.”).
130. This rule says:
If a party makes a motion under this Rule 55.27 but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available that this Rule 55.27 permits to be raised by
motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or
objection so omitted, except a motion as provided in Rule 55.27(g)(2) on any
of the grounds there stated.

MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.27(f). A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted is among the defenses listed in Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure
55.27(g)(2).
131. 183 S.W.3d 582 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
132. Id. at 588 (citing State ex rel. Lambert v. Flynn, 154 S.W.2d 52, 57
(Mo. 1941)).
133. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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ter jurisdiction and tempt litigants “to label every statutory restriction on
claims for relief as a matter of jurisdictional competence.”136 Only the first
two reasons – lack of a constitutional basis and potential erosion of circuit
courts’ subject matter jurisdiction – appear to have true significance.137
J.C.W. is correct, however, that after the 1976 amendment of Article V
the constitution does not specifically provide for statutory restrictions.138
And, in light of section 14(a)’s grant of plenary subject matter jurisdiction,
the provision is open to an interpretation that statutory restrictions of the
circuit courts’ jurisdictional power are inconsistent with the constitution.
A cogent counterargument can be made, however, that the constitution’s
grant of plenary power to the circuit courts is not inconsistent with all statutory restrictions. Notably, the grant of plenary power arguably is not inconsistent with the General Assembly’s delegation of exclusive jurisdiction to an
administrative agency.139
The J.C.W. court’s second reason for refusing to recognize jurisdictional
competence was its apprehension that the doctrine eroded the principle of
separation of powers and “rob[bed] the concept of subject matter jurisdiction
of the clarity that the constitution provides.”140 Again, this conclusion may
be true for such statutory restrictions as section 452.455.4. But, by implying
that an exclusive administrative remedy should be treated like section
452.455.4 – a lesson that the McCracken court gleaned from J.C.W – the decision has the potential effect of eroding the separation of powers doctrine in
the opposite direction. It could diminish the General Assembly’s inherent,
plenary power to grant unfettered, exclusive jurisdiction to administrative
agencies.141 As separate, but complementary, arms of government, the circuit
courts and administrative tribunals should function effectively side-by-side,
each with their unique jurisdictions, rather than assume adjudicative baili-

136. Id.
137. Undoubtedly, litigants can be expected to characterize any issue or matter in

a way that works to their benefit – so long as it is within the confines of ethical practices, of course. Indeed, one of the developments since McCracken has been that
litigants and judges characterize any issue that before J.C.W. had been dubbed jurisdictional as “authority” to proceed. See infra Part III.E. Surely the burden should fall
on judges’, rather than litigants’, shoulders to discern and ward off mischaracterizations of the law.
138. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252-54 (“Elevating statutory restrictions to matters of ‘jurisdictional competence’ erodes the constitutional boundary established by
article V of the Missouri Constitution.”).
139. See infra Part V.B. for a discussion of such an interpretation.
140. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254.
141. See Akin v. Dir. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)
(“Our constitution in article III, § 1, invests the General Assembly with broad, plenary, legislative powers . . . .”).
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wicks with no thought of the effects on the other tribunal.142 As will be discussed later in this Article, McCracken’s application of J.C.W.’s simple approach to exclusive administrative remedies opened up the potential for erosion of the concept that the judiciary and administrative tribunals are to function as cooperative arms of effective government.143

2. Distinguishing Personal Jurisdiction from
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Apparently prompted by the intermediate appellate courts’ variously
characterizing section 452.455.4 as personal jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction, J.C.W. discerned a need to distinguish between these two grand
elements of jurisdiction.144 Each element, the court noted, answers separate
questions concerning the adjudicative process.145 Personal jurisdiction answers the question of an entity’s power over whom.146 Subject matter jurisdiction answers the question of power over what.147
J.C.W. defined personal jurisdiction as the “power of a court to require a
person to respond to a legal proceeding that may affect the person’s rights or
interests.”148 It clarified that a lack of personal jurisdiction “means simply
that the constitutional principle of due process bars [the court] from affecting
the rights and interests of a particular person, whether such a ‘person’ be an
individual or an entity such as a corporation.”149 On the other hand, J.C.W.
defined subject matter jurisdiction as “the court’s authority to render a judgment in a particular category of case.”150 Indeed, as commentators have explained, subject matter jurisdiction is “the competency of a court to hear and
142. See State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 73-74
(Mo. 1982) (en banc) (“The purpose of the doctrine of separation of powers . . . is to
prevent the abuses that can flow from centralization of power. While the autonomy of
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches lies at the heart of our system of government . . . . Each branch constitutes only a part of a single government and must
interact harmoniously with the other two. The independence of the branches must be
consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the Constitution
in one indissoluable bond of union and amity . . . . From a pragmatic standpoint it is
obvious that some overlap of functions necessarily must occur. The complexity of
modern government demands the delegation of some administrative and decisional
authority to executive agencies because of their particular areas of expertise.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143. See infra Parts IV.B, C.
144. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252.
145. See id. at 253.
146. Id. at 252-53.
147. Id. at 253.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
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decide particular categories of cases”151 and refers to a court’s authority to
adjudicate the type of controversy, or class of cases, sub judice.152 Professors
Allen Ides and Christopher May explained, “‘Type’ refers to the nature of the
controversy, e.g., civil claims in general, probate proceedings, marriage dissolution, etc.”153 But, J.C.W. also defined subject matter jurisdiction as “the
authority of a court to render judgment in a particular case . . . .”154 Missouri’s sister jurisdictions concur that subject matter jurisdiction refers both to
the category of cases and to issues pertaining to the court’s authority to render
judgment in a particular case. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has defined subject matter jurisdiction as “a court’s authority to hear and determine a particular class of actions and the particular questions presented to
the court for its decision.”155
Hence, subject matter jurisdiction, so defined, encompasses the domain
of what Missouri courts identified before J.C.W. as the third element of jurisdiction: the “power to render the particular judgment in the particular
case.”156 J.C.W. concluded, therefore, that any issue or statute not focused
on a court’s power over the parties and that involves the adjudicative process
in virtually any manner constitutes subject matter jurisdiction.157 Consequently, the J.C.W. court determined that any statutory impediment to a Missouri court’s power to adjudicate a case or matter cannot, by definition, be
jurisdictional.158 As the previous definitions indicate, any such statute would
constitute a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction in contravention of the
Missouri Constitution’s granting the circuit courts exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction.
J.C.W., however, did not distinguish among the various statutory restrictions.159 The court seemed to view a statute like section 452.455.4 and its
bond requirement similar to a statute establishing an exclusive administrative
remedy. Of course, pursuant to its inherent legislative power, the General
Assembly is still free to enact such statutes, but J.C.W.’s lesson was that Missouri courts must treat such statutes as non-jurisdictional.

151. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6.
152. 1 ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL

ACTIONS: TERRITORIAL BASIS AND PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION OF STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1-1 (3d ed. 1998).
153. ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 279 (2d ed. 2006).
154. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254.
155. Giersdorf v. A & M Constr., Inc., 820 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Minn. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted).
156. See supra text accompanying note 113.
157. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252-54.
158. See id. at 254.
159. See id.
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3. Effect of Treating Statutory Restrictions
as Non-Jurisdictional Rules
Treating a statute as non-jurisdictional has significant practical effects
on the adjudicatory process. The most notable effect is that it moves the burden of enforcing the rule from the court to the parties. The courts have no
obligation to see that a non-jurisdictional rule is enforced because these rules
concern matters of personal privilege and are imposed primarily for the parties’ benefit. A party waives its rights to enforcement of a non-jurisdictional
rule by failing to assert it at the proper time.160
This was a key lesson that the McCracken court gleaned from J.C.W.
The McCracken court perceived J.C.W.’s approach as requiring it to treat
even a statute that completely abolished a cause of action as nonjurisdictional.161 McCracken inferred from J.C.W. that a trial court should
proceed with adjudicating the case, even if it recognized that the action implicated a cause that no longer existed.162

C. The Circuit Courts’ Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Plenary
The second point of J.C.W.’s jurisdiction lesson is that Article V,
section 14(a) grants Missouri circuit courts plenary subject matter jurisdiction.163 J.C.W.’s emphasis on section 14(a)’s “plenary terms”164 lent itself
to the McCracken court’s conclusion that the circuit courts’ original jurisdiction over “all cases and matters, civil and criminal,” is broad enough to
include even administrative adjudications.165 Later, while addressing how
to handle non-jurisdictional rules, the opinion treated alike all statutes imposing impediments on a circuit court proceeding without regard for the nature of
the impediment.166
The J.C.W. court inferred that, if the subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri circuit courts is all-encompassing, the circuit courts have authority to
hear any case.167 Thus, the circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction includes
cases and matters of whatever kind, even administrative adjudication. Hence,

160. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
161. See id. at 479.
162. See id. at 477-78.
163. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 253.
164. Id.
165. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 476-77 (quoting MO. CONST. art. V, § 14).
166. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 255 (“When a statute speaks in jurisdictional terms or
can be read in such terms, it is proper to read it as merely setting [non-jurisdictional]
limits on remedies or elements of claims for relief that courts may grant.”).
167. See J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254.
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a circuit court judge’s task of determining whether its court has subject matter
jurisdiction in any given lawsuit is “simple.”168 J.C.W. explained:
169

Applying [the jurisdictional basics set out in J.C.W.] makes simple
the task of determining jurisdiction: The present case is a civil case.
Therefore, the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction and, thus,
has the authority to hear this dispute. The circuit court also has the
power to render a judgment that binds the parties, who both are resi170
dents of Missouri. Therefore, it has personal jurisdiction.

D. Distinguishing Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional Fact-Finding
A significant issue in J.C.W. was who sets the amount of the bond required by section 452.455.4: the circuit court or the Division of Child Support
Enforcement, the relevant state administrative agency.171 The court analyzed
the issue:
If, as Mother claims, Father did in fact owe more than $10,000 in child
support arrearages, the plain language of section 452.455.4 would
prohibit him from filing a motion to modify. The statute says that the
bond shall be in the amount of past child support “owed as ascertained
by the division of child support enforcement or reasonable legal fees
of the custodial parent, whichever is greater, before the filing of the
petition.” . . . Father cannot be barred from judicial relief by a factual
determination made by the division of child support in the absence of
172
an opportunity for judicial review of the issue.

The J.C.W. court resolved the issue by framing it as a matter of separation
of powers. “Article I, section 14 [of the Missouri Constitution],” the court
reasoned, “provides that the ‘courts of justice shall be open to all.’
This means that the key to the courthouse door cannot be in the hands of an
enforcement agency.”173
An alternative way of resolving the issue of who is to set bond, especially in light of J.C.W.’s emphasis on jurisdiction, is to understand the issue as a
matter of jurisdiction. The amount of the bond is a jurisdictional fact, and
168. Id.
169. J.C.W. actually said, “Applying this principle to the present case makes sim-

ple the task of determining jurisdiction[.]” Id. The principle discussed in the previous paragraph was jurisdictional competence. Id. The court obviously did not intend
for “this principle” to refer to jurisdictional competence. Apparently, the court was
referring to its entire discussion of jurisdiction. See id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 256-57.
172. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 256-57 (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 257.
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jurisdictional facts – those determining whether or not an entity has the power
to hear and determine a case174 – are always questions of law.175 Courts decide questions of law.176 Thus, as a question of law, the circuit court and not
the Division of Child Support Enforcement should have determined the
amount of the bond.

E. J.C.W.’s Simple Approach Creates Confusion
As appealing as J.C.W.’s simple approach is, it did not prove to be quite
so simple in Missouri courts’ early attempts at application. J.C.W.’s analysis
caused confusion among Missouri judges as they struggled to understand
J.C.W.’s scope. Judges encountered difficulty determining whether J.C.W.’s
approach truly applies to every restraint on the adjudicatory process, statutory
or otherwise.
A good example of this confusion involves the time constraints on filing
motions for post-conviction remedies.177 Before J.C.W., Missouri courts
declared it was obligatory to dismiss any motion filed beyond deadlines set
by the Supreme Court’s rules because those deadlines were jurisdictional.178
After J.C.W., the Supreme Court of Missouri continued to declare that courts
were obligated to dismiss motions for missed deadlines, but it offered no explanation for the basis of the dismissal,179 leaving Missouri’s intermediate
appellate courts to struggle with the issue. Confusion ensued.
In Swofford v. State, the court acknowledged J.C.W.’s instruction concerning jurisdiction and read the decision to require that a deadline set out in
the Missouri Supreme Court rules was no longer a jurisdictional matter.180
The Swofford court decided to use what it described as its inherent “power
and duty to enforce Missouri Supreme Court rules” to dismiss a late-filed
motion deadline even though the state’s attorney did not object until appeal.181 The court reasoned that its inherent power authorized it to disregard
“whether or not the state raised the issue [at the trial level] or on appeal because the state cannot, by failing to object, waive a movant’s noncompliance

174. Harold M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547-48 (2008).
175. Greene v. St. Louis Cnty., 327 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo. 1959) (“Unless the
jurisdictional facts appear upon the record no jurisdiction is conferred and none can
be exercised.”) (citing Whitely v. Platte County, 73 Mo. 30, 31 (1880)).
176. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (“The quintessential power of the judiciary is the power to make final determinations of questions of law.”).
177. See Snyder v. State, 334 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
178. Clark v. State, 261 S.W.3d 565, 569 & n.1 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008).
179. See Gehrke v. State, 280 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
180. 323 S.W.3d 60, 62-63 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010).
181. Id. at 63-64.
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with the time constraints of the post-conviction relief rules.”182 The court
apparently deemed J.C.W.’s lesson as primarily a labeling issue – that is, it
could treat the deadline as a jurisdictional rule so long as it did not refer to the
issue as jurisdiction.
Struggling with the same issue, the court in State ex rel. Scroggins v.
Kellogg183 took a similar position but used different analysis. Although
J.C.W. did not mention restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court’s rules,
the Kellogg court read J.C.W. as applying to restrictions of all kinds, including those set out in rules of procedure.184 Although the Kellogg court understood J.C.W. to require that it treat the rule of procedure as non-jurisdictional,
it still treated the rule as jurisdictional by dismissing a post-conviction motion
only because it was filed late notwithstanding the lack of objection by the
state.185 Its only explanation for the court dismissing the motion was that “a
statute or rule . . . may still limit the court’s ability to grant a remedy.”186
In Snyder v. State, the court addressed the same issue but disagreed with
Swofford and Kellogg.187 The Snyder court viewed J.C.W. and McCracken as
requiring circuit courts to treat the state’s failure to object to a missed deadline as a waiver of the issue.188 Although the deadline surely was not imposed for the benefit of the state, the Snyder court concluded that J.C.W. required it to treat the deadlines as a matter of personal privilege, subject to
waiver by the state’s attorney at his or her discretion.
As evidenced by these decisions, Missouri judges have responded to
J.C.W. by treating all restrictions on their authority, whether imposed by statute or by rule, as involving merely a matter of labeling. Judges adopted a
practice of substituting the term “authority” for any ruling that they would
have called an issue of jurisdiction before J.C.W. but still treating the issue as
a matter of jurisdiction.189 They use “authority” to describe a court’s power
Id. at 63.
311 S.W.3d 293 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
See id. at 296-97.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 297.
334 S.W.3d 735, 738-39, 738 n.6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
Id. at 738-39 (quoting McCracken’s declaration that “if a matter is not
jurisdictional but rather is a procedural matter required by statute or rule or an affirmative defense of the sort listed in Rule 55.08, then it generally may be waived if not
raised timely.”).
189. The judges adopted the practice from the Supreme Court’s opinions. In
McCracken, the court noted that previous courts had “confused the concept of a
circuit court’s jurisdiction . . . with the separate issue of the circuit court’s statutory or
common law authority to grant relief in a particular case.” McCracken v. Wal-Mart
Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). In State ex rel. Praxair,
Inc. v. Missouri Public Service Commission, the court cited J.C.W. in declaring that a
previous decision, State ex rel. AG Processing, Inc. v. Thompson, 100 S.W.3d 915
(Mo. App. W.D. 2003), had improperly used “the term ‘jurisdiction’ [when] the more
appropriate term would be authority.” 344 S.W.3d 178, 192 n.9 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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to make a ruling, render a judgment, review a petition, or simply proceed with
adjudication190 and continue on, using the same analysis it used before J.C.W.
Hence, rather than clarifying and simplifying jurisdiction, as the Supreme Court of Missouri hoped, J.C.W. resulted in form over substance in
Missouri courts. Of more significance, J.C.W.’s simple approach to jurisdiction, which failed to provide clear rules for distinguishing jurisdictional and
non-jurisdictional rules, has created unnecessary confusion concerning the
power of administrative agencies to exercise their exclusive jurisdiction. As
applied by McCracken, J.C.W. portends significant change in how courts
should analyze statutes granting administrative agencies, such as the Division
of Workers’ Compensation, exclusive jurisdiction.

IV. MCCRACKEN’S APPLICATION OF J.C.W. TO EXCLUSIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
A. Workers’ Compensation Remedy is an Affirmative Defense
Ten months after handing down J.C.W., the Supreme Court of Missouri
applied J.C.W.’s jurisdictional lesson in McCracken, a case implicating
workers’ compensation statutes.191 The McCracken court ruled that, although
the circuit court found plaintiff’s case to be within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Division of Workers’ Compensation, the circuit court erred by dismissing the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction.192 The circuit court dismissed the
lawsuit because it determined the plaintiff was the defendant’s statutory employee,193 and, according to sound precedent at the time, any claim filed
against a plaintiff’s statutory employer was within the division’s exclusive
jurisdiction.194 The McCracken Court held, however, that this precedent re-

190. E.g., Mansheim v. Dir. of Revenue, 357 S.W.3d 273, 277 n.5 (Mo. App. E.D.
2012) (“authority to review [a] petition”); Wright v. Bartimus, Frickleton, Robertson
& Gorny, 364 S.W.3d 558, 565 n.6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (“‘authority’ to render a
particular judgment”).
191. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 475.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 474-75. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.040.1 (Supp. 2012) states:
Any person who has work done under contract on or about his premises which
is an operation of the usual business which he there carries on shall be deemed
an employer and shall be liable under this chapter to such contractor, his subcontractors, and their employees, when injured or killed on or about the premises of the employer while doing work which is in the usual course of his
business.
194. Harris v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (Mo. 2007) (en banc);

Romero v. Kan. City Station Corp., 98 S.W.3d 129, 137 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003). MO.
REV. STAT. § 287.120.2 (Supp. 2012) says:
The rights and remedies [granted by the Workers’ Compensation Act] to an
employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his
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sulted from “confused” analysis,195 and it summarily overruled the prior cases.196 “To treat workers’ compensation defenses differently,” the court declared, “would promote ‘continued confusion in the courts as to whether a
court’s error[] in following a statute . . . [is] jurisdictional in nature.’”197
The plaintiff in McCracken filed a negligence action against the operator
of a Walmart store in Neosho.198 The plaintiff alleged that a Walmart employee negligently caused a delivery rack to fall on him as he delivered bread
to the store.199 The plaintiff averred that his employer, Interstate Brands,
settled his workers’ compensation claim against it.200 But, on the day trial
was to begin, Walmart filed a motion to dismiss in which it asserted that the
plaintiff was its statutory employee and, therefore, the division had exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter as a workers’ compensation claim.201 After a
hearing on the issue, the circuit court agreed with Walmart that the plaintiff
was Walmart’s statutory employee and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.202
In reversing the circuit court’s dismissal, the McCracken court drew upon its understanding of J.C.W. to hold that the circuit court had jurisdiction
regardless of what workers’ compensation statutes said.203 Merely because
the plaintiff’s complaint averred a negligence action, the court concluded that
“the [Workers’ Compensation] Act could not overrule the provision of Article
V, section 14 giving circuit courts jurisdiction over personal injury claims.”204
The McCracken court instructed that the circuit court should have ignored the issue of whether the matter was a workers’ compensation claim
because the issue did not implicate jurisdiction at all.205 It explained that the
provision of workers’ compensation statutes for an exclusive administrative
remedy constitutes an affirmative defense because these statutes are merely
non-jurisdictional rules.206 Thus, the parties could choose to waive the right

wife, her husband, parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next
kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death . . . .
195. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 477.
196. Id. at 479 (“To the extent that these . . . cases hold that the [Workers’ Com-

pensation] Act’s applicability is a matter of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, they are overruled.”).
197. Id. (citing J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo.
2009) (en banc)) (alterations in original).
198. Id. at 475-76.
199. Id. at 475.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 476.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 476-77.
204. Id. at 475, 479.
205. Id. at 475-76.
206. Id. at 478-79.
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to have the Division of Workers’ Compensation adjudicate the case in favor
of trying the matter in circuit court as a negligence action.207
In actuality, the lawsuit proceeded in the circuit court much like the
McCracken court envisioned that it should.208 Consistent with the McCracken court’s charted course, the circuit court assumed until immediately before
trial that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s negligence
suit.209 The circuit court persisted in this assumption until the defendant, in a
last-minute motion to dismiss, called the circuit court’s attention to its belief
that the plaintiff was its statutory employee, making the matter a workers’
compensation case.210 The circuit court immediately convened a hearing,
decided the defendant was correct – a decision the McCracken court ruled
was wrong211 – and dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit on the grounds that the
division, rather than the circuit court, had jurisdiction over the matter.212 The
McCracken court said this was the point at which the circuit court’s handling
of the case went awry.
According to McCracken, the circuit court erred by allowing Walmart to
raise its contention that the plaintiff was a statutory employee in a motion to
dismiss because the matter should have been raised as an affirmative defense.213 By taking up the issue in a motion to dismiss, McCracken reasoned,
the circuit court necessarily treated the matter of the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy as a jurisdictional issue.214 McCracken was correct that the trial court did treat the issue as jurisdictional, but it obviously did
so because the Supreme Court’s previous cases had declared the matter to be
jurisdictional.215 McCracken rejected these cases as wrongly decided, stating
that they were the results of “sloppy” analysis.216 McCracken explained that
“the issue [of whether or not the plaintiff is a statutory employee] is not a

207. Id. at 479.
208. See id. at 478.
209. Id. at 476.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 481.
212. Id. at 476.
213. Id. at 477.
214. Id. at 479.
215. Just two years earlier, the Supreme Court of Missouri said:
As noted in James v. Poppa, 85 S.W.3d 8, 9 (Mo. banc 2002), a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an appropriate means of raising the workers’ compensation law, chapter 287, as a defense to a common
law tort action. A court shall dismiss the action whenever it appears that the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. As the term ‘appears’ suggests, the
quantum of proof is not high; it must appear by the preponderance of the evidence that the court is without jurisdiction.

Harris v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (footnote
omitted).
216. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 478.
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jurisdictional one . . .”217 because it is not a question that affects the circuit
court’s subject matter jurisdiction to decide his claim.”218
The McCracken court acknowledged that Walmart’s not raising the issue as an affirmative defense would have, under normal circumstances, resulted in the court’s deeming the defense waived.219 But, because previous
courts “erroneously [treated the workers’ compensation remedy] as a jurisdictional one in the mid-1980s and thereafter,” the court accorded Walmart grace
and considered the issue despite its untimely assertion.220

B. McCracken’s Potential Effect on
Exclusive Administrative Law Remedies
McCracken highlights a trap for the unwary defendant. As a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense, workers’ compensation – and presumably
any exclusive administrative remedy – is an issue of personal privilege that
a party can waive.221 If Walmart was correct that the plaintiff was its statutory employee, waiting until the day of trial to assert a workers’ compensation
remedy thwarted the General Assembly mandate of an exclusive remedy.222
Under McCracken’s analysis, the trial court should have deemed the
workers’ compensation remedy waived and proceeded with the trial of
the plaintiff’s tort claim without regard for whether the Division of Workers’
Compensation had exclusive authority over the claim under the workers’
compensation statutes.
McCracken’s analysis thus jeopardized the exclusivity of the workers’
compensation remedy. This jolting prospect prompted two commentators to
ask whether the case was “the opening jab in a bout to knockout (or work
around) the exclusive remedy bar established by the Missouri workers’ compensation statute[.]”223 Indeed, without exclusivity, workers’ compensation
simply cannot function as the legislature intended.224 McCracken opened the
door to the possibility that an employee could evade the workers’ compensaId. at 475.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 475.
Id.
MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.27(a) requires that an affirmative defense be asserted in
the responsive pleading if one is required. The McCracken court excused Walmart’s
tardiness “because prior cases had stated that this issue was jurisdictional . . . , [so] the
matter will be treated as preserved in this case.” 298 S.W.3d at 475. The court then
ruled that the circuit court had erred in finding that the plaintiff was a statutory
employee. Id.
223. Guffey & Sturycz, supra note 78, at 206.
224. Loretta F. Samenga, Workers’ Compensation: The Exclusivity Doctrine, 41
LAB. L.J. 13, 15 (1990) (Exclusivity “is and has been the heart and soul of workers’
compensation legislation since its enactment.”).
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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tion remedy simply by suing his or her employer in a negligence action.225
As was evident in Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., litigants do at times
seek to evade workers’ compensation to avoid its perceived drawbacks.226
While the General Assembly enacted workers’ compensation as a benefit to employees, those benefits come with tradeoffs.227 The most notable
downside to workers’ compensation for employees is the typically smaller
recoveries than those awarded in civil tort actions.228 To compensate for
lower recoveries, the General Assembly built into workers’ compensation
advantages for employees, such as a “no-fault” approach under which employees are relieved of the burden of proving their employer’s liability.229 An
employee can establish employer liability merely by showing that his or her
injury arose out of an on-the-job accident.230 These advantages can be
enough of an incentive for employer defendants to want to avoid a workers’
compensation remedy. The McCracken court apparently recognized these
incentives and admonished employees who might try to use tort actions to
evade workers’ compensation:
[The plaintiff does not have] an undefeatable right to have his claim
determined in circuit court just because he chose to file it there in the
first instance, without regard to whether he is Wal-Mart’s statutory
employee or whether his claim is otherwise one that Missouri statutes
commit to determination by the [Labor and Industrial Relations]
Commission. Rather, it means that this issue should be raised as an

225. See Guffey & Sturycz, supra note 78, at 208.
226. 824 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); see discussion of Goodrum supra notes

65-75 and accompanying text.
227. In Thomas v. City of Springfield, the court described the purpose of workers’
compensation statutes as
to provide financial and medical benefits to the victims of 'work-connected”
injuries and to their families – regardless of fault – and to allocate the financial
burden to the most appropriate source, the employer, and, ultimately, the consumer.” This policy underlies Missouri’s own approach to adjudicating workers’ compensation claims . . . .

88 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002) (quoting Leslie A. Bradshaw, Annotation,
Suicide as Compensable Under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 15 A.L.R.3d 616, 622
(1967)). Indeed, the driving force behind Missouri’s adoption of workers’ compensation was labor unions which pushed for it as a benefit for their members. PATRICK J.
PLATTER, I MO. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.4 (MoBar, 3d ed. 2004).
228. Samenga, supra note 224, at 15-16.
229. See Amanda Yoder, Note, Resurrection of a Dead Remedy: Bringing Common Law Negligence Back into Employment Law, 75 MO. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2010).
230. See id.
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affirmative defense to the circuit court’s statutory authority to proceed
231
with resolving his claim.

This response treats the issue merely as a matter of trial procedure and strategy and fails to appreciate the essential nature of the exclusive remedy to
workers’ compensation.
A litigant seeking to evade the workers’ compensation remedy can be
defeated only by a defendant that asserts the workers’ compensation statutes
properly and in a timely manner – unlike Walmart in McCracken.232 Indeed,
a defendant may be quite willing, for strategic reasons, to have a workers’
compensation case tried in a civil court rather than by an administrative law
judge. After all, the General Assembly established workers’ compensation
primarily for the benefit of employees.233

C. Potential for Dual, Conflicting Lines of Cases
Not only does McCracken’s analysis threaten the exclusivity of the
workers’ compensation remedy, but it also creates the potential for dual contradictory lines of cases.234 This potential diversion raises, of course, the
specter of forum shopping.235 These potential ill effects were avoided when
the Division of Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate an employee’s claim for an on-the-job accident.236
Dual lines of conflicting cases could undermine the policymaking of the
Division of Workers’ Compensation.237 After McCracken, an appellate judge
warned of the potential for such an undermining.238 In his dissenting opinion
in State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Co. v. Cook, Judge
James Smart admonished that the circuit court’s adjudication of a claim that,
“on its face, purports to have arisen out of an employment relationship” before the division adjudicated it would undermine division policy by allowing
“a civil jury the initial right to decide” causation, an issue previously deemed
to be within the division’s exclusive jurisdiction.239 Judge Smart characterized such an arrangement – one seemingly adopted by the McCracken court –
as “a ground-breaking change in the law.”240
231. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
232. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.08.
233. See sources cited supra note 227.
234. See State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d
14, 51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (Smart, J., dissenting).
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 50-51.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 51.
240. Id.
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Such a result is groundbreaking because it jeopardizes the very reason
for administrative agencies’ existence.241 As the Supreme Court of Missouri
has recognized, expertise is agencies’ raison d’être.242 For example, briefly
after Missouri’s first administrative agency, the Public Service Commission,
came into existence in 1913, the Supreme Court noted the commission’s expert staff and observed that it had “at hand more expert machinery [for ratemaking] than any earthly Legislature possesses.”243 Without doubt, the
commission has more ratemaking expertise than any circuit court.244 The
theory underlying administrative decision-making, including its adjudicatory
decisions, is that agencies’ streamlined, unencumbered procedures facilitate
neutral, expert solutions to society’s complex problems more efficiently than
what the legislative or judicial branches can deliver.245
Moreover, statutes granting exclusive administrative remedies embody
expressions of society’s values.246 Missourians were reluctant to join the
national movement to substitute workers’ compensation remedies for common law tort actions asserting claims for on-the-job accidents.247 When they
241. See generally Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative
Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 476-77 (2003) (explaining the benefits of using administrative agencies to implement regulatory and
benefit programs).
242. See, e.g., Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 1991)
(en banc).
243. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 194 S.W. 287, 291-92 (Mo.
1917) (en banc). The court further explained:
The situation as to common carriers changes from year to year . . . . A fixed,
hard and fast rate made one year might be almost confiscatory next year . . . .
No legislature has the time, nor is it equipped with the machinery necessary to
investigate matters of ratemaking in any manner which will serve to prevent
its enactment of laws fixing alleged “reasonable maximum rates” from being
other than a mere guess.

Id. at 291.
244. See id. at 295-96.
245. Levy & Shapiro, supra note 241, at 476-77.
246. See id. at 503-04.
247. Missourians accepted workers’ compensation only after labor forces pushed
relentlessly for more than a decade for the reform. PLATTER, supra note 227. The
General Assembly first considered workers’ compensation legislation in 1915, but
supporters could not muster enough support to pass a law. Id. When on-the-job accidents increased significantly toward the end of World War I, unions pushed harder for
workers’ compensation, and the General Assembly passed a bill in 1919 after bitter
debate. Id. The Governor signed it, but business interests mounted a referendum
campaign that resulted in the law’s repeal by a narrow margin. Id. The General Assembly passed another workers’ compensation bill in 1923, which the Governor
signed, but again opponents were able to get it repealed in a second referendum campaign in which businessmen promised to work with legislators to formulate a better
bill. Id. The General Assembly passed a compromise bill in 1925, which again was
put to a popular vote. Id. With labor and business leaders endorsing it, voters ap-
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did, they inculcated their values and expectations into the workers’ compensation statutes.248 The Supreme Court of Missouri’s failure to perceive and
apply a jurisdictional rule such as section 287.120.2 frustrates operation of
democratic ideals and agency policymaking.
The judiciary’s failure to heed traditional jurisdictional boundaries dividing civil actions from administrative adjudications not only compromises
the advantages of agency expertise, but it also thwarts uniformity of the law.
Inconsistent application of the law results in injustice; outcomes thus become
dependent on a litigator’s ability to have his case tried by one tribunal rather
than another.249

D. Basis for Disputing McCracken’s Characterization of Section
287.120.2 as a Non-Jurisdictional Rule
McCracken’s characterization of section 287.120.2 as a nonjurisdictional, affirmative defense is subject to dispute. First, the court’s
characterization relied heavily on early cases that recognized workers’ compensation as an affirmative defense.250 McCracken failed to recognize that
the statutes relied upon by the early decisions were significantly different
than the statutes in effect in 2009. Second, a cogent argument can be made
that a statute like section 287.120.2, which abolished a civil cause of action
and supplanted an administrative remedy for it, is not the same as the statute
that was at issue in J.C.W.251

1. McCracken’s Misplaced Reliance on Early Workers’
Compensation Cases
Key to the McCracken court’s conclusion that section 287.120.2 was a
non-jurisdictional, affirmative defense was the court’s misperception of early
workers’ compensation cases.252 The court noted that “Missouri courts . . .
proved the measure during the November 1926 election. Id.; see also Price V.
Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers' Compensation in the
United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & Econ. 305, 320 n.A1 (1998).
248. See Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort
Concepts Reveal About Goals, Results and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 28687 (2008); Levy & Shapiro, supra note 241, at 504.
249. See State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d
14, 51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (Smart, J. dissenting) (explaining how such inconsistencies can develop).
250. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc) (citing Warren v. Am. Car & Foundry Co., 38 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1931) (en
banc); Kemper v. Gluck, 39 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. 1931) (en banc); Schneider v. Union
Elec. Co., 805 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991)).
251. See discussion supra Part II.A.
252. See McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 478-79.
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required from the first cases addressing the issue in the early 1930s” that parties claiming the exclusive workers’ compensation remedy must assert the
remedy “as an affirmative defense under Rule 55.08 rather than by a motion
to dismiss where, as here, the worker has chosen to proceed by filing a tort
suit.”253 The court was correct. The early workers’ compensation cases, one
of the first being Kemper v. Gluck (on which the McCracken court relied
heavily), did declare that “[w]here an action is at common law and invokes
common-law liability only, an exception to such liability created by statute is
not an element of the cause of action; it is a matter of defense.”254
McCracken, however, failed to account for a significant difference between workers’ compensation laws in effect in 1931, when the Supreme
Court of Missouri handed down Kemper, and those governing in 2009. The
most notable difference was that the 1931 statutes made workers’ compensation optional.255 They permitted employees and employers to elect “to reject
[the Workers’ Compensation] act.”256 The 1931 statutes did not include a
provision like section 287.120.2’s mandate that workers’ compensation be the
exclusive remedy.257 After the General Assembly established workers’ compensation in Missouri in 1925, it remained an elective remedy until 1974,
when the legislature made it compulsory for all employers who had five or
more employees.258 The General Assembly expanded workers’ compensation
coverage again in 1990 to include all construction industry employers who
had employees.259
When the Supreme Court handed down Kemper, workers’ compensation
had been a part of Missouri statutes for only a few years. The plaintiff in
Kemper sued her employer in tort for redress of injuries suffered while doing
her job as a restaurant waitress, and she won an award.260 On appeal, the
employer asserted for the first time that workers’ compensation was the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy.261 The Kemper court recognized that the predecessor
to the Division of Workers’ Compensation, the Compensation Commission,
had jurisdiction over such claims in appropriate cases, but it did not deem the
issue to be jurisdictional in that particular case because the employer did not
253. Id. at 475.
254. 39 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Mo. 1931) (en banc).
255. Id. at 331; see also PLATTER, supra note 227.
256. Kemper, 39 S.W.2d at 331.
257. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120.2 (2012) (amended 2013) provides:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other
rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband, parents, personal
representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or otherwise, on
account of such injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not
provided for by this chapter.
258. PLATTER, supra note 227.
259. Id.
260. Kemper, 39 S.W.2d at 331.
261. Id.
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raise workers’ compensation in its pleadings.262 The Kemper court put the
burden on the employer to raise workers’ compensation as an affirmative
defense for the obvious reason that workers’ compensation was not the exclusive, mandatory remedy at that time.263
In 1931, employees and employers could opt out of workers’ compensation.264 As a result, the appropriate remedy depended on the election made by
the plaintiff or her employer to opt in or out. The election made the issue a
matter of pleading, as the Kemper court explained in a quotation emphasized
by McCracken:265 “[t]he burden is upon the party claiming the applicability
of the [Workers’ Compensation] act to bring himself under it . . . . [and] if he
would make it a defense, he must plead and prove himself within its
terms.”266 As an elective program, workers’ compensation was an exception
to common law liability.267 An employee and employer could opt for a tort
remedy rather than workers’ compensation. Hence, it was a matter of an
affirmative defense.268
All of that changed in 1974 when the General Assembly abolished
common law liability – or tort actions for on-the-job accidents – and
substituted compulsory workers’ compensation.269 Thus, the McCracken
court’s reliance on Kemper’s assertion that workers’ compensation is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense, while true when Kemper was decided, was
misplaced.

2. Workers’ Compensation Supplanted Tort Actions
for Workplace Injuries
When the General Assembly changed workers’ compensation to a mandatory, exclusive remedy in 1974, the statute became a jurisdictional
rule. The statute removed the choice not to participate in workers’ compensation.270 By making workers’ compensation the only remedy for workplace
262. Id. at 331-34.
263. See id. at 333-34.
264. Id. at 331-34. This option obviously was one of the compromises that facili-

tated passage of workers’ compensation in Missouri after several failed attempts. See
PLATTER, supra note 227, at §§1.3-1.4.
265. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
266. Kemper, 39 S.W.2d at 333.
267. PLATTER, supra note 227, at § 1.3,
268. See Kemper, 39 S.W.2d at 333-34.
269. PLATTER, supra note 227. Those more recent cases to which McCracken
cited as holding that workers’ compensation was an affirmative defense relied on the
Kemper line and also failed to perceive the effect of the law change. See McCracken,
298 S.W.3d at 479.
270. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.030 (2000) (defining the term “employer” for
purposes of the Workers’ Compensation statutes); § 287.120.1 (Supp. 2012) (“Every

File: Spinden – Final Formatting – 1/23/14

854

Created on: 2/18/2014 11:17:00 AM

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 2/18/2014 11:17:00 AM

[Vol. 78

injuries, 271 the General Assembly did not deprive the circuit courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate claims based on workplace injury or death. Instead,
it eliminated a civil cause of action for on-the-job accidents and substituted
workers’ compensation. As the Supreme Court of Missouri recognized,
even after McCracken, “The General Assembly . . . has enacted remedies
that displace damages actions altogether, in workers compensation
proceedings, which substitute administrative proceedings for common law
damages actions.”272 It was a change the Supreme Court declared to
be “unobjectionable.”273
Therefore, workers’ compensation arguably does not affect a circuit
court’s original jurisdiction over civil claims for on-the-job accidents.
The McCracken court correctly concluded that the issue of whether the case
was a workers’ compensation matter “is not a question that affects the circuit
court’s subject matter jurisdiction,”274 but the reason was also not, as the
court surmised, that workers’ compensation is “an exception to the normal
rule that tort cases are determined by the circuit court.”275 Rather, the issue
was that the General Assembly, pursuant to its legislative prerogative,
abolished any tort action for a claim arising out of an accidental on-the-job
injury or death. The circuit courts’ plenary subject matter jurisdiction
includes only “cases and matters, civil and criminal.”276 No civil action exists
in Missouri whereby an employee can sue his or her employer for a claim
arising out of an accidental on-the-job injury or death because the General
Assembly abolished it.
An exclusive workers’ compensation remedy, therefore, does not usurp
the circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot by definition. The
circuit courts have no authority or power claim to adjudicate a case or matter
that does not exist. The Missouri Constitution grants circuit courts original
jurisdiction only over cases and matters that are cognizable. And, in Missouri, no cause of action exists outside of workers’ compensation in which a

employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury
or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment.”).
271. See § 287.120.2 (“The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee
shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband,
parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or
otherwise, on account of such injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are
not provided for by this chapter.”).
272. Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 779 (Mo. 2010)
(en banc).
273. Id.
274. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 479.
275. Id.
276. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14.
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plaintiff can assert a claim against his or her employer for injuries suffered in
an on-the-job accident.
As the United States Supreme Court explained long ago, jurisdiction is a
tribunal’s power to adjudicate the merits of a case and to “dispose of it as
justice may require.”277 The Supreme Court of Missouri has agreed: “Subject
matter jurisdiction . . . exists only when the tribunal has the right to determine
the controversy . . . or grant the relief prayed.”278 Because the circuit courts
have no power to adjudicate claims fitting within the parameters of section
287.120.2, they have no subject matter jurisdiction.279 Hence, the determination of whether a case falls within section 287.120.2 is a jurisdictional issue.

V. ALTERNATIVES TO MCCRACKEN’S ANALYSIS
Although the McCracken court’s analysis focused primarily on protecting the circuit courts’ plenary subject matter jurisdiction, the court was mindful that its decision would affect the exclusivity of workers’ compensation as
a remedy for on-the-job injuries.280 The court did not show a desire to bring
about the demise of the exclusive workers’ compensation remedy, but it apparently perceived that, to protect the circuit courts’ jurisdiction, its only option was to strip jurisdictional status from workers’ compensation and any
other exclusive administrative remedy. If the court recognized that it had
other options, it did not indicate it. The court had at least four alternative
approaches to the one applied in McCracken. Each has the advantage of protecting the circuit courts’ jurisdiction while still according jurisdictional status to the exclusive workers’ compensation remedy.

A. Alternative One: Properly Distinguish Between
Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional Facts
In a distinction seemingly overlooked by the J.C.W. court,281 jurisdictional facts, in contrast to non-jurisdictional facts, are always questions
of law282 for courts to decide.283 The distinction between jurisdictional facts

277. The Resolute, 168 U.S. 437, 439 (1897).
278. State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Mo.

1982) (en banc) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120.2 (Supp. 2012).
280. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 477 (The circuit courts having subject matter
jurisdiction “does not mean that Mr. McCracken has an undefeatable right to have his
claim determined in circuit court . . . .”).
281. See supra Part III.D.
282. Greene v. St. Louis Cnty., 327 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo. 1959) (“Unless the
jurisdictional facts appear upon the record no jurisdiction is conferred and none can
be exercised.”) (citing Whitely v. Platte Cnty., 73 Mo. 30, 31 (1880)).
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and non-jurisdictional facts becomes particularly significant when a civil
action implicates statutes mandating an exclusive administrative remedy.
In such cases, because administrative agencies are strictly creatures of statute,284 a court’s determination of jurisdictional facts necessarily requires
statutory construction,285 and statutory construction is an issue of law.286
Thus, the circuit court, not an administrative agency, must determine jurisdictional facts.287 Obviously an administrative agency’s determination of
its own jurisdiction would be tantamount to allowing an agency to “add to its
own powers and create rights and duties beyond what the Legislature
provided or intended.”288
On the other hand, substantive facts are not matters of law but questions
of fact.289 In a case involving an administrative remedy, the administrative
agency is to decide such facts.290 These facts define the merits of a case –
that is, they concern what conduct, or lack thereof, subjects the actors
(or those who fail to act) to liability and who can seek redress for the
specified conduct.291
The substantive merits of a Missouri workers’ compensation case are set
out in section 287.120.1. This statute says, “Every employer subject to the
provisions of this chapter [who] shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to
furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury
or death [conduct] of the employee [who] by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employee’s employment [conduct] . . . .”292 A claimant bears

283. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (“The quintessential power of the judiciary is the power to make final determinations of questions of law.”).
284. State ex rel. Praxair, Inc. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 344 S.W.3d 178, 192
(Mo. 2011) (en banc) (“The [Public Service Commission] is an administrative body
created by statute and has only such powers as are expressly conferred by statute and
reasonably incidental thereto.”); Union Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 591 S.W.2d
134, 137 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979).
285. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592,
598-99 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
286. City of St. Joseph v. Vill. of Country Club, 163 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Mo. 2005)
(en banc).
287. Harris v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)
(“[J]urisdiction remains in the trial court unless it appears by a preponderance of the
evidence that the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of workers’ compensation law. . . . [T]he court must examine the facts presented and find by a preponderance of the evidence that the issue contested is one within the [Workers’ Compensation Division’s] expertise.”).
288. Soars v. Soars-Lovelace, Inc., 142 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Mo. 1940).
289. Wasserman, supra note 174, at 1548.
290. Spencer v. Zobrist, 323 S.W.3d 391, 399 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
291. Wasserman, supra note 174, at 1548.
292. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (Supp. 2012).
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the burden to present facts that establish the elements.293 Because these elements govern who can make a claim and for what, their underlying factual
issues are matters of substantive merit.294 Because section 287.120.1 sets out
factual issues of substantive merits, only the Division of Workers’ Compensation can determine these facts, including whether an injury resulted from an
on-the-job accident.
Contrast these provisions with the provisions in section 287.120.2. This
statute declares that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for an
employee making a claim that satisfies the elements set out in section
287.120.1.295 By invoking the exclusive remedy, section 287.120.2 sets out a
jurisdictional rule. J.C.W. warned of being misled by statutes that spoke “in
jurisdictional terms or [could] be read in such terms . . . ,” but it was referring
to statutes that set “statutory limits on remedies or elements of claims for
relief that courts may grant.”296 The workers’ compensation statutes are truly
jurisdictional. They mandate that workers’ compensation “rights and remedies . . . shall exclude all other rights and remedies . . . .”297 This provision,
especially coupled with another subsection of section 287.120, which releases
an employer “from all other liability whatsoever,”298 is clearly jurisdictional.
These statutory restrictions are not like the bond requirement at issue in
J.C.W. Rather, these provisions abolish all causes of action except for workers’ compensation as adjudicated by the division.
Thus, the McCracken court correctly declared that the circuit court was
the proper entity to decide whether the plaintiff was the defendant’s statutory
employee, but it was not for the reason asserted by McCracken. The
McCracken court concluded that the circuit court should decide the issue
because it was “not a jurisdictional one . . . .”299 In actuality, the circuit court
should have decided the jurisdictional facts (whether the plaintiff was
the defendant’s statutory employee) because the issue was jurisdictional.
If the plaintiff was not the defendant’s statutory employee, the division would
not have authority to adjudicate the matter as a workers’ compensation claim.
293. Russell v. Sw. Grease & Oil Co., 509 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Mo. App. K.C.D.
1974) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d
220 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
294. Wasserman, supra note 174, at 1548.
295. § 287.120.2 (“The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband, parents,
personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or otherwise,
on account of such injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.”).
296. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 255 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
297. § 287.120.2.
298. § 287.120.1.
299. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
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Because the issue was to be determined by the jurisdictional facts, the
circuit court, not the division, was the proper entity to decide the matter as a
question of law.
Because J.C.W. and McCracken did not make such distinctions between
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facts and explain their significance, Missouri courts have failed to understand how to apply these important, fundamental concepts when analyzing jurisdictional issues. For example, in Cook
the court endeavored to apply McCracken’s analysis to determine who had
jurisdiction – the circuit court or the Division of Workers’ Compensation – in
a case in which the plaintiff complained of “an occupational disease” rather
than an “accident.”300 The plaintiff sued his former employer for negligence
for allegedly exposing him to asbestos, which caused him to develop mesothelioma.301 The employer argued for summary judgment on the grounds that
the plaintiff’s claims constituted a workers’ compensation claim.302
Rather than distinguishing jurisdictional facts from non-jurisdictional
facts, the Cook court interpreted the workers’ compensation statutes to decide
whether the plaintiff’s claim fit within their scope.303 In a 9-2 split, the majority ruled that because occupational diseases are outside the scope of workers’ compensation statutes, which provide a remedy only for on-the-job accidents, the circuit court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.304
The Cook court incorrectly treated the factual issue – whether an occupational disease constitutes an accidental injury – as jurisdictional. This issue
is not jurisdictional because it pertains to the substantive merits of the case.
Hence, the facts giving rise to the issue are non-jurisdictional facts to be
determined by the division.305 By allowing the circuit court to involve itself
in the matter, the Cook court usurped the division’s authority. More
importantly, the intrusion created the opportunity for the circuit court to contradict the division’s prior decisions concerning what constituted an accident,
thereby creating conflicting lines of cases and interfering with the division’s
ability to set policy.306
Unlike the Cook court, the circuit court in McCracken correctly perceived the nature of the factual question it considered – whether the plaintiff

300. State ex rel. KCP & L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14,
16 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 18.
304. Id. at 19-20.
305. That the Cook majority would make the very error decried in McCracken –
mischaracterizing rules of substantive merits as jurisdictional rules – is ironic in light
of the majority’s painstaking and laborious attempt to follow J.C.W.’s and McCracken’s analysis.
306. Cook, 353 S.W.3d at 51 (Smart, J., dissenting).
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was the defendant’s statutory employee – to be jurisdictional.307 After deciding that the plaintiff was, in fact, the defendant’s statutory employee, the circuit court correctly understood that the matter was within the division’s exclusive jurisdiction.308 Because the workers’ compensation statutes abolish
all causes of action for on-the-job injuries, the circuit court arguably lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.309 Dismissal was its only option. On the other
hand, if the circuit court had reached the decision that the McCracken court
did – that the plaintiff was not the defendant’s statutory employee – the circuit court would have properly retained jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s
determination that the plaintiff was not the defendant’s statutory employee
made the matter a valid, cognizable negligence action not supplanted by
workers’ compensation law. 310
Such an analytical approach protects the circuit courts’ plenary subject
matter jurisdiction while avoiding the jeopardy that McCracken posed to
administrative adjudication. By distinguishing between jurisdictional and
non-jurisdictional facts, the circuit court has a sound basis for dismissing
invalid tort actions over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction, such as
workers’ compensation matters, enabling the appropriate entity to exercise its
jurisdiction.311 Moreover, the circuit court has the authority to dismiss the
matter sua sponte.312

B. Alternative Two: Interpret Section 14(c) as
Not Including Administrative Adjudications
Another alternative to the all-or-nothing approach of McCracken is to
understand that the terms “cases” and “matters” used in Article V, section
14(a) of the Missouri Constitution do not necessarily refer to administrative
adjudications. Missouri case law considering the nature of administrative
adjudication is not abundant, but the few cases that address the issue conclude
that administrative cases do not constitute traditional civil actions. Arguably,
therefore, they do not fit within the terms “cases” or “matters” as used by
section 14(a).
In Bridges v. State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts, the court
held that administrative adjudications are not traditional civil cases.313 Bridges concerned an administrative action against a physician whose license to
practice medicine was revoked by a state administrative board on the ground
307. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 474-75 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
308. The McCracken court reversed this decision. Id. at 479.
309. See supra Part IV.D.2.
310. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 481.
311. Green v. St. Louis Cnty., 327 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo. 1959).
312. Cook v. Cook, 97 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002).
313. 419 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo. App. 1967).
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that he performed illegal abortions.314 At issue was the physician’s assertion
that the board wrongfully denied his request for a continuance of a hearing to
consider revocation of his license.315 He made the request pursuant to a statute, which required continuance of a civil case if the attorney involved in the
case was a legislator who was attending a legislative session when the civil
case was scheduled.316 The Bridges court rejected his contention, partly because the statute applied only to civil or criminal cases, and the board’s hearing, as an administrative proceeding, was neither.317
In reaching this conclusion, the Bridges court relied on the Supreme
Court of Missouri’s decision in State v. Harold.318 In that case, the court
declared a juvenile proceeding was neither a criminal nor a civil matter.319
The court reasoned that it could not be a civil case – described as “a private
right or the redress or prevention of a private wrong” – because juvenile proceedings are “administrative police regulations.”320 The court explained:
The State is not a party to the proceedings in the sense that parties
seek the protection of private rights or prevention of private wrongs in
civil cases. Juvenile cases may partake something of the nature of civil cases and also of criminal cases. However, under the basic distinctions between civil and criminal cases recognized in this state for
many years, we conclude that the instant proceeding does not classify
as a “civil case” within the meaning of the term as used in the consti321
tutional appellate jurisdictional sense.

The Bridges court also relied on State ex rel. Ball v. State Board of
Health, in which the Supreme Court of Missouri considered another physician licensing matter.322 The State Board of Health revoked a physician’s
license to practice medicine and surgery for “unlawfully solicit[ing] patrons

314. Id. at 280.
315. Id. at 281.
316. Id. The statute said:
In all civil cases or in criminal cases pending in any court of this state at any
time when the general assembly is in session, it shall be a sufficient cause for
a continuance if it shall appear to the court, by affidavit, that . . . any attorney . . . of such party is a member of either house of the general assembly, and
in actual attendance on the session of the same, and that the attendance of
such . . . attorney . . . is necessary to a fair and proper trial or other proceeding
in such suit . . . .

MO. REV. STAT. § 510.120 (1959) (emphasis added).
317. Bridges, 419 S.W.2d at 281.
318. 271 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1954).
319. Id. at 529.
320. Id. at 530.
321. Id. (emphasis added).
322. 26 S.W.2d 773 (Mo. 1930).
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by agents.”323 In response to the defrocked physician’s complaints that the
board had not followed adequate civil procedures, the court observed that
the proceeding before the board was not a lawsuit; therefore, the board was
not obligated to heed the technical rules of a judicial trial.324 The court
further explained:
The state board of health is not a court . . . . It can issue no writ. It
can try no case – render no judgment. It is merely a governmental
agency, exercising ministerial functions. It may investigate and satisfy itself from such sources of information as may be attainable as to
the truth or falsity of charges of misconduct against one holding one of
its certificates, but its investigation does not take on the character of a
judicial trial. To guard and protect the health and welfare of its people
the state must have its ministerial agents or officers and [e]ntrust them
325
with power . . . .

Moreover, the Missouri Constitution deems administrative adjudications
sufficiently distinctive that it makes special provision for subject matter jurisdiction for judicial review of the adjudications. The constitution mandates
that, when no other provision of law sets the jurisdiction for judicial review,
the Supreme Court shall set it by rule. The constitution states:
Unless otherwise provided by law, administrative decisions, findings,
rules and orders . . . shall be reviewed in such manner and by such
court as the supreme court by rule shall direct and the court so designated shall, in addition to its other jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to
326
hear and determine any such review proceeding.

Arguably, this provision would be unnecessary if section 14(a)’s reference
to “all cases and matters” included judicial review of administrative
adjudication.
Thus, the McCracken court had a sound basis for interpreting “cases”
and “matters” in section 14(a) as excluding administrative adjudications.
Such an interpretation would permit recognition of the exclusivity of workers’ compensation as a jurisdictional issue while still protecting the circuit
courts’ plenary subject matter jurisdiction.

323. Id. at 774.
324. Id. at 777.
325. Id. at 777 (emphasis added) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting State ex

rel. Goodier v. McAnnally, 93 S.W. 928, 929-30 (Mo. 1906) (en banc)).
326. MO. CONST. art. V, § 18.
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C. Alternative Three: Deem Workers’ Compensation Claims
Masquerading as Tort Actions Non-Justiciable
Even if the Supreme Court of Missouri rejects the premise underlying
the previous two alternatives – that determination of an exclusive administrative remedy is a jurisdictional issue or administrative adjudications do not fit
within section 14(a)’s reference to “cases” and “matters” – it has another
means for preserving administrative agencies’ exclusive jurisdiction without
jeopardizing the circuit courts’ plenary subject matter jurisdiction. It could
employ the doctrine of justiciability. Not all cases over which a circuit court
has subject matter jurisdiction are appropriate for judicial action – only
claims that are justiciable.
Justiciability is a doctrine, closely related to jurisdiction, which developed as a means for ascertaining when a court’s exercise of jurisdiction
is appropriate. The principles of justiciability are largely prudential in nature;
the judiciary tempers its exercise of power for the benefit of the whole, and
for the sake of good government.327 The Supreme Court of Missouri recognizes that a significant component of justiciability is that a judicial action
be “appropriate for judicial determination.”328 Missouri courts also explain
that a question is justiciable only if a case is “ripe” for the judiciary’s determination.329 The Supreme Court held that a trial court should defer to an
administrative agency’s having jurisdiction in a matter by dismissing the
lawsuit pending before the court “until after [the administrative] tribunal has
rendered its decision.”330 These principles give a circuit court means for
refusing to consider a matter that it recognizes – sua sponte or otherwise – as
a cause of action invoking the jurisdiction of an administrative agency. And,
as J.C.W. put it, the circuit court can do so without “getting all jurisdictional
about it.”331
Indeed, in the case of a tort claim arising out of an on-the-job accident,
the circuit courts would have prudential, or policy-based, reasons for asserting that the claim is not justiciable. By declaring that workers’ compensation
cases masquerading as tort actions are non-justiciable, the courts would facili327. CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & EDWARD COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE

PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS, § 3529 (3d ed. 2008); see
State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 73-74 (Mo. 1982)
(en banc); Annbar Assoc. v. W Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 645
(Mo. 1965) (en banc).
328. Cnty. Court of Wash. Cnty. v. Murphy, 658 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1983) (en
banc); Jacobs v. Leggett, 295 S.W.2d 825, 834 (Mo. 1956) (en banc).
329. Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dept. of Labor & Indus. Relations, 277
S.W.3d 670, 678 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (plurality opinion); Mo. Health Care Ass’n v.
Att’y Gen. of Mo., 953 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
330. Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
331. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
AND
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tate operations of democratic ideals and policies underlying the administrative agencies, notably expertise and specialized knowledge. Equally important, the courts would avoid development of dual, contradictory lines of
cases that would instigate forum shopping and undermine agency policy.
The judiciary’s robust application of the doctrine of justiciability in tort
actions implicating exclusive administrative remedies would go a long way in
avoiding the potential pitfalls emerging from McCracken. The Supreme
Court of Missouri could protect the breadth of the circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction while preserving operation of administrative adjudication in
the manner envisioned by the General Assembly.

D. Alternative Four: Reinstate the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most viable option is one closely related to the concept of
justiciability,332 which – since McCracken – has already been employed by
the Missouri Court of Appeals. It is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, developed by the federal courts more than a century ago as a means for preserving effective operation of federal administrative agencies in cases in which
the federal courts and agencies have concurrent jurisdiction.333
The Supreme Court of Missouri sets 1932 as the year Missouri adopted
a form of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.334 As the court describes
Missouri’s version of the doctrine, it applies to issues involving “administrative expertise, technical factual situations and regulatory systems in which
uniformity of administration is essential.”335 The court instructed trial courts
to dismiss actions meeting these criteria in deference to the jurisdiction
of administrative agencies.336 Although Missouri courts applying the
doctrine typically emphasize the need for expertise,337 clearly the need to

332. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 327, at § 3531.6.
333. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41 (1907).
334. Lamar v. Ford Motor Co., 409 S.W.2d 100, 106-07 (Mo. 1966) (en banc)

(“The doctrine has been widely applied by the federal courts and has been accepted
by the state courts . . . . The appellate courts of this state have had occasion to apply
the doctrine principally in matters involving the Public Service Commission Act. In
State ex inf. Shartel ex rel. City of Sikeston v. Missouri Utilities Co., . . . 53 S.W.2d
394, 401 [(Mo. 1932)] . . . , the court suggested that the question of public necessity
for the continuation of electrical service was ‘a matter peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission,’ and, therefore, was not for consideration in
an action to oust utility.”).
335. Id. at 107.
336. See id.
337. E.g., Harris v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)
(“The determination of the existence of an employer/employee relationship is not a
question requiring agency expertise.”).
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maintain uniformity in the administrative agencies’ adjudications is also a
significant component.338
Using the primary jurisdiction doctrine to dismiss tort actions that were
in actuality workers’ compensation claims became so common that courts
dropped reference to primary jurisdiction and spoke only of jurisdiction in
general terms.339 What the McCracken court attributed to erroneous and
sloppy analysis340 were more likely decisions applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine without so specifying. This appears to be the case in the one
decision cited by McCracken.341
In Cooper v. Chrysler Group, LLC, the court employed the doctrine in
its review of a lawsuit in which the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries suffered in an apparent on-the-job slip and fall accident.342 The circuit court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation.343 The Cooper
court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to reverse the circuit court’s
judgment and remand with instructions that the trial court stay the plaintiff’s
lawsuit until the Division of Workers’ Compensation determined “whether
there was an ‘accidental injury’ as defined by the Workers’ Compensation
Law.”344 The key to the Cooper court’s mandate was that the circuit court
was directed not to dismiss the action on remand.345 Instead, it was to put the
circuit court proceedings on hold until the division had a full opportunity to
exercise its adjudicatory authority.346
Three months earlier, two Missouri appellate judges called attention to
the doctrine in separate dissenting opinions in Cook.347 Weighing in on
whether the circuit court or the Division of Workers’ Compensation should
determine whether a plaintiff’s tort claim is within the exclusive purview of
the workers’ compensation statutes,348 Judge James Welsh argued that, even
after McCracken, primary jurisdiction still operates when workers’ compensation statutes are implicated:

338. Lamar, 409 S.W.2d at 107.
339. E.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620, 621, 623 (Mo. 2002)

(en banc).
340. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 475, 478 (Mo.
2009) (en banc).
341. Id. at 478 (citing Wallace, 73 S.W.3d at 621, 623).
342. 361 S.W.3d 60, 61-62 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011).
343. Id. at 61.
344. Id. at 61-62.
345. See id. at 67.
346. See id.
347. State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14,
44, 46 (Welsh, J., and Smart, J., dissenting in separate opinions).
348. Id. at 16.
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The circuit court does not have the option of retaining the case, proceeding to adjudicate [a non-jurisdictional factual issue] and the negligence issue, and then entering judgment accordingly. While both the
[division] and the court may have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction of the dispute, only one forum is the proper initial forum under
these circumstances. The case must be dismissed so that it can be processed in the [division] because the [division] is the only proper initial
349
forum for the matter in this procedural setting.

In his dissenting opinion, Judge James Smart offered this description of
the doctrine:
The concept . . . is grounded partially in practicality and partially in
the concept of separation of powers. It permits a “workable allocation
of business” between the courts and the agencies established by the
legislature . . . . It applies where a claim that could (originally) have
been addressed in a court has, under a regulatory scheme, been placed
350
under the special competence of an administrative body.

Indeed, in Missouri’s post-McCracken era, this common law doctrine
seems to offer the best prospect for maintaining a peaceful coexistence between the judicial and executive branches of Missouri government. The
United States Supreme Court endorsed it as “key” to achieving “consistent
and coherent policy” between courts and agencies.351 Another federal court
suggested that an excellent way to integrate an agency into the judiciary’s
decision-making is to give the agency “the first word” on issues within the
agency’s jurisdiction.352
Because the doctrine is, as Judge Smart indicated, grounded in prudential considerations, Missouri courts are free to use it to carve out the best approach for achieving effective adjudication for a litigant. In an approach taken by the Cooper court, the courts certainly can stay their proceedings to give
an administrative agency whose jurisdiction has been implicated an opportunity to adjudicate issues within the agency’s exclusive purview. The circuit
court would retain jurisdiction over the case while it awaits action by the
agency. The agency should not feel obligated to address an issue and can
decline to act on a matter. As had been the courts’ custom prior to McCracken, a court can dismiss the entire lawsuit when it concludes that the matter is
within an agency’s jurisdiction. It typically reaches this decision after con349. Id. at 43-44 (Welsh, J., dissenting).
350. Id. at 50 (Smart, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Modern Air

Transp., Inc., 179 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1950)).
351. Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,
400 U.S. 62, 68 (1970).
352. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 532 F.2d 412, 417 (5th
Cir. 1976).
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ducting an evidentiary hearing, as the trial court did in McCracken, to gather
the jurisdictional facts.

E. Getting the Last Say Under Judicial Review
Under primary jurisdiction or the other alternatives to the all-or-nothing
analysis of McCracken, the courts have assurance that any administrative law
matter it turns away will return to the judiciary for review after the agency
enters its final decision and the matter is ripe for review.353 Thus, although
the administrative tribunal has the first say, the judiciary has the last say in its
review of the agency’s decision pursuant to its constitutional authority set out
in Article V, section 18.354
Therefore, in the primary jurisdiction doctrine or the other alternatives,
the judiciary has available a flexible, effective means to achieve its central
goal of protecting its plenary subject matter jurisdiction. At the same time,
the judiciary achieves a workable allocation of business between it and the
administrative agencies, with an aim of promoting good government.

VI. CONCLUSION
According to the Supreme Court of Missouri’s understanding, two factors “bring down to earth and clarify the meaning of . . . ‘jurisdiction.’”355
The first factor is that Missouri’s constitution grants circuit courts subject
matter jurisdiction “over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.”356 The
second factor is that the General Assembly is powerless under the constitution to diminish this all-encompassing jurisdictional power.357 The Supreme
Court understands these factors to mean that no statute can restrict the circuit
courts’ jurisdictional power and, if the statute claims to restrict the circuit

353. MO. CONST. art. V, § 18.
354. This provision says,
All final decisions, findings, rules and orders on any administrative officer or
body existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasijudicial and affect private rights, shall be subject to direct review by the courts
as provided by law; and such review shall include the determination whether
the same are authorized by law, and in cases in which a hearing is required by
law, whether the same are supported by competent and substantial evidence
upon the whole record.

MO. CONST. art. V, § 18.
355. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
356. MO. CONST. art. V, § 14(a).
357. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254-55.
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courts’ exercise of its power in any way, the statute is necessarily nonjurisdictional and can be enforced, if at all, by the parties.358
In formulating this “simple” approach to jurisdiction,359 the J.C.W. court
locked its focus on the term “all” in the constitution’s grant of jurisdiction
over “all cases and matters.”360 The court concluded that “all” means that a
circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over every cause of action – even
one abolished by the General Assembly – so long as the case purports to be
“a civil case.”361
Pursuant to its inherent legislative authority, the General Assembly abolished common law tort claims for on-the-job accidents and substituted the
workers’ compensation remedy.362 To be lawful, this legislative prerogative
must satisfy the constitution’s requirements for separation of powers and its
guarantee of a right for every legal wrong.363 The General Assembly’s abolition of such tort actions did not offend the constitution. By substituting
workers’ compensation for the tort action, the General Assembly provided a
means for redressing on-the-job injuries. And, by giving the Division of
Workers’ Compensation only quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative authority,
the legislature did not cause the division to unduly intrude into the circuit
courts’ domain.364 Hence, the General Assembly did not violate separation of
powers in substituting workers’ compensation for common law tort claims for
on-the-job accidents.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Missouri seemed to perceive in
McCracken that the recognition of workers’ compensation as an exclusive
remedy intrudes into the circuit courts’ domain. The only way this could be
the case is if the language “all cases and matters” includes workers’ compensation claims. In other words, a conclusion that the circuit court in McCracken had subject matter jurisdiction is proper only if the circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction with the Division of Workers’ Compensation. Concluding that circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the division is clearly
contrary to separation of powers.
The circuit courts’ concurrent jurisdiction means that the General Assembly would be powerless to abolish a cause of action in Missouri. Notwithstanding the General Assembly’s abolition of tort claims for on-the-job
accidents, the circuit courts still have jurisdiction over these claims by virtue
of the courts’ jurisdiction over all cases, including workers’ compensation
claims. However, this is a dubious proposition. As the Supreme Court observed previously, “Article V [of the Constitution], the Judicial Article, is
358. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 298 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
359. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 254.
360. Id. at 253-54.
361. Id. at 254.
362. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (Supp. 2012).
363. J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 255.
364. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
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devoted to governing the courts and judges, and we do not read the [1976]
amendment [granting the circuit courts plenary jurisdiction] as a constraint
upon the previously established power of the administrative agencies.”365
Furthermore, deeming the circuit courts to have concurrent jurisdiction
has the effect of centralizing adjudicative power in the judiciary, thereby
nullifying the General Assembly’s authority to ever grant jurisdiction exclusively to an administrative agency.366 It renders the General Assembly
powerless to create an administrative agency that can operate without the
circuit courts’ improper intrusion on agency policy and expertise. As
the Supreme Court has long recognized, “‘[A] careful study of the whole
Constitution will . . . demonstrate that it was not the purpose to make a total
separation of [legislative, executive, and judicial] powers. . . . Each branch
constitutes only a part of a single government and must interact harmoniously
with the other two.”367
Under the McCracken court’s perception of jurisdiction, harmonious interaction between Missouri’s circuit courts and administrative tribunals is
seriously threatened. The court’s insistence that the circuit courts have jurisdiction and can adjudicate claims that are not even causes of action in Missouri (claims arising out of on-the-job accidents) enables the judiciary to run
roughshod over the General Assembly’s inherent power to abolish causes of
action and to substitute an exclusive administrative remedy.
The Supreme Court of Missouri acted with the understandable aim of
protecting the circuit courts’ plenary jurisdiction. What the court seemingly
failed to appreciate, however, was that it could achieve this worthy goal without trampling on the authority of the other branches of government. Several
sound alternatives outlined in this Article are available to the court and would
simultaneously preserve the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the state’s
administrative tribunals. For the sake of sound government and effective
operation of the state’s administrative agencies – presumably not mutually
exclusive concepts – Missouri’s courts must rethink their analysis of administrative agency jurisdiction.

365. Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 12 (Mo. 1992)
(en banc).
366. Killian v. J & J Installers, 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (citing
Hannah v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)).
367. State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Mo.
1982) (en banc) (quoting Rhodes v. Bell, 130 S.W. 465, 468 (Mo. 1910)).

